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PENNIES FROM HEAVEN:' AN EXPANDED THEORY
OF ENTITLEMENT FOR STATE COURT CLAIMANTS
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS FEE-SHIFTING
STATUTES
Barbara Stark*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article will explore the availability of attorneys' fees under
the federal civil rights fee-shifting statutes2 in actions brought in
1.
Every time it rains, it rains
Pennies from heaven.
Don't you know each cloud contains
Pennies from heaven.
You'll find your fortune falling all over town,
Be sure that your umbrella is upside down.
Trade it for a package of sunshine and flowers,
If you want the things you love, you must have showers.
So when you hear it thunder, don't run under a tree,
There'll be pennies from heaven for you and me.
Pennies From Heaven (Album & song lyrics recorded by Bing Crosby) (reproduced in CD
format by Intersound International, 1988).
© 1990 by Barbara Stark.
* Visiting Assistant Professor and Coordinator, Legal Writing Program, Rutgers Law
School, LL.M., 1989, Columbia University; J.D., 1976, New York University; B.A., 1973,
Cornell University. I am deeply grateful to Harold Korn, Eric Neisser and John Payne for
being so generous with their time, encouragement and criticism. I would also like to thank
Brenda Adams, Frank Askin, Jonathan Hyman, Arthur Kinoy, Louis Raveson, Nadine Taub,
Arthur Wolf, the students in the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic who worked on the
Mount Laurel fee litigation and Elizabeth Urbanowicz, for her skill and patience in typing the
manuscript.
2. This includes the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988
(1976) (the "Fees Act"); Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1972)
(repealed 1978); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 2973(e) (1978)
(repealed 1981); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42
U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). Note, Sureying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293, 1294 n.9 (1984). As set forth in the
legislative history of the Fees Act, "Since 1964, every major civil rights law passed by the
Congress has included, or been amended to include, one or more fee provisions .... " Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
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state courts and won on state claims. As Congress and the courts
have recognized, the availability of such fees is critical in the continuing struggle for civil rights.' The question of attorneys' fee awards
in state courts is particularly urgent as we enter the 1990's for three
basic reasons.
First, state courts offer a relatively attractive forum for civil
rights claimants faced with an unreceptive, if not hostile, federal
bench. Second, it has been suggested that we are in a new stage of
civil rights litigation,' grappling with subtler, and perhaps more
deeply ingrained, threats to those rights.' Through carefully structured litigation in state courts, and the opportunity for local experimentation which they provide, civil rights claimants can generate
productive new approaches to these difficult issues.' Third, and perhaps most significant, the law regarding fee awards under the fee"The Act's legislative history indicates that Congress intended the standards for awarding
fees under the Act, including the meaning of 'prevailing,' to be generally the same as that
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Note, supra, at 1295-96 & n.18.
Most of the discussion in this article refers generally to any of the civil rights fee-shifting
statutes, although each has its own idiosyncrasies and the reader should check the particular
statute before assuming that the general proposition applies. See Sager, The Suprene Court
1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 307 & n.51 (1981).
3. See Poll Reports Majority Believe Race Prejudice is Still Strong, N.Y. Times, Aug.
9, 1988, at A13. ("Majorities in all education, income and ideological groups, said American
society was racist over all.").
See generally Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination
Lau': A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (arguing
that civil rights laws sabotage necessary radical change by promising reform); see also Kelman,
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297-98 & n.12. But cf Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (discussing rights theory and practice as a venerable and critical component in the dialectic of
social change in this country).
4.

See generally L. EISENBERG,

CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

459 passim (1981).
5. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (no statutory or constitutional violation established, notwithstanding finding of psychological harm to black plaintiffs
who had objected to the closing of a public road which effectively forced them to drive around,
rather than through, an all-white neighborhood on trips within the city), criticized in Sager,
supra note 2, at 310-19.
6. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), supplemented, 63
N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), modified on reh'g, 69 N.J.
133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975), vacated 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d
129 (1976) (vacated on grounds of new legislation); NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); "[W]e should expect that
as public interest litigants increasingly use the state forums, more state cases will be decided
under the Fees Act." M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES 14-28
(1986). See generally Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: TheJurisprudence of Federalismn After Garcia, 8 SuP. CT. REV. 341 (1985) (analyzing the theoretical foundations of
federalism).
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shifting statutes is in the process of being remolded by the Supreme
Court. There have been several important fee award decisions' since
the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 (the "Fees Act"' ) in which the Court considers questions central to the scope and purpose of the fee-shifting statutes. The impact
of these decisions on state court awards is an open question. This
article attempts to clarify the role of attorneys' fee awards by state
courts in the changing federal scheme. Moreover, it suggests an approach for determining whether such fees should be awarded which
better comports with the Supreme Court's latest decisions, as well as
to the mandate of the Civil Rights Acts, than the tests currently
applied.
II.

OUTLINE OF THE ARTICLE

This article is divided into three main sections. The first section,
Part III, provides the background essential for an understanding of
the purpose and operation of the federal fee-shifting statutes. It describes the origins of the civil rights fee-shifting statutes; recounts the
legislative history of the Fees Act; and briefly considers the significance of attorneys' fee awards for plaintiffs prevailing on state claims
in state courts today.
The second main section, Part IV, discusses the two tests (the
"State Claims Tests" 9 ) under which attorneys' fees are awarded
where a plaintiff prevails on a state claim. This section describes the
two tests and discusses the ways in which the states have interpreted
and applied them. It concludes that the State Claims Tests have outlived their usefulness.
Finally, in Part V, a proposal is made to eliminate the State
Claims Tests and replace them with a "prevailing party" test. The
consequences of rejecting the State Claims Tests are analyzed in
light of the Supreme Court decisions rendered since their adoption,
and some of the questions left open by the proposal are explored.
7. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984);
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987); North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 61 (1986); Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School
Dist., 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
8.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).

9.

The tests are set forth at text accompanying infra note 49.
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BACKGROUND

Protecting Civil Rights

The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were
passed by the Reconstruction Congress to dismantle the institution of
slavery.10 These rights were effectively buried by Justice Bradley's
decision in The Civil Rights Cases." In that decision, the rights protected by the Wartime Amendments 2 were characterized as being
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states, as opposed to federal
rights cognizable in federal court. In view of the state courts' notorious enmity toward the recently emancipated blacks, especially in the
south, as a practical matter this left claimants without a remedy. 3
Thus, for almost a hundred years the Wartime Amendments
were dormant."' They were resurrected in the early 1960's by the
civil rights movement and the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of
1957,and 1960' and were recognized by the Court in Brown v.
Board of Education. 6 The Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965 and
1968'" represented Congress' renewed commitment to essential principles of racial equality. These three pieces of legislation, considered
as a whole, expanded both the conceptual scope'" and the functional
application of these principles. 9
For a comprehensive portrayal of the aftermath, see E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
1863-1877 (1988). See generally Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 508
(1928) (characterizing enactments occasioned by the Civil War, providing for removal of cases
from state to federal court, as "ad hoc legislation not abstract or systematic assertion of federal
power, but measures . . . directed towards demonstrated inadequacy of state agencies.").
11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XIV & XV.
13. See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387
(1967); Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L. REV.
475, 476 n.9 (1969) (discussing the infamous Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877).
14. L. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 2; See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
10.

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1976).

15. L. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 1.
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For discussion of the aftermath of Brown, including the difficulties presented by its implementation, see Wilson, Brown v. Board of Education Revisited,
12 KANSAS L. REV. 507 (1964); Pollack, Ten Years After the Decision, 24 Fed. B.J. 123
(1964); Comment, De Facto Segregation-The Elusive Spectre of Brown, 9 VILL. L. REV. 283
(1964).
17. L. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 2.
18. The Civil Rights Acts addressed previously did not include persons and acts. Segregation in places of public accommodation, for example, was barred by subchapter two. 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
19. "Under a coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination . . . [these] statutes [are to be] construed expansively." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
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In addition to establishing stiff sanctions for violations of the
statutes, Congress sought to devise more effective mechanisms for
their affirmative enforcement. A major thrust of this effort was the
notion of private citizens acting as "private attorney generals,"2 who
could vindicate these rights in the courts even if the state was lax in
enforcing them.2 Access to the courts for these "private attorney
generals" was a major concern. The focus was on the federal courts,
which were still generally regarded as more sympathetic as well as
more principled than the state courts.2 2
In the 1960's, scant attention was given to the question of state
court attorneys' fee awards because to those who were familiar with
the history of civil rights, it was virtually unimaginable that a state
court would be the forum of choice for a civil rights plaintiff.2" Far
from being concerned about access to state courts, the drafters of the
1960's legislation were worried that the states would somehow undermine the federal scheme. It was feared, for example, that the
states could short circuit the process and prevent claimants from ever
reaching court by requiring that state administrative remedies first
be exhausted.2
It was further recognized that if enforcement were to be effective, a mechanism was needed to assure that the attorneys bringing
such suits would be paid. In this country, each party bears her own
legal expenses under what is commonly referred to as the "American
rule." 5 This approach, however, is impractical in civil rights litigation. Civil rights cases are often in court for years.2a Persons who
(1971).
20. The phrase was first used by Judge Jerome Frank in Associate Indus., Inc. v.
Ickles, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). Comment, Court
Awarded Attorneys Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 658
(1974).
21. Congress has other means of encouraging litigation. Leubsdorf, Toward a History of
the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRORS. 9, 34 & n.184
(Winter 1984). As Professor Leubsdorf has noted, however, fee-shifting statutes are politically
expedient. "They are popular with at least some members of the practicing bar, call for no
immediate [clongressional appropriation, and leave at least some of the blame for the resulting
litigation on private clients and private lawyers." Id. at 35. Cf Freeman, supra note 3 (arguing that such laws may actually legitimize discrimination).
22. See generally Hyman, Book Review, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 971, 984-85 (1984).
23. The Warren Court was particularly sensitive to the question of federal court access.
See Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (abstention doctrine should not be
applied in civil rights case where further delay is unjustifiable.)
24. Interview with Howard Glickstein, Dean of Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 1988).
25. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 21.
26. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (adminis-
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have been discriminated against are unlikely to have the resources to
finance prolonged litigation."7 There is rarely an economic incentive
for any individual to persist in such litigation since the cost is likely
to exceed any damages which are recoverable."8 Civil rights litigation, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, often benefits persons
who are not parties, making it difficult both to evaluate what a particular lawsuit is really worth to those who stand to gain from it and
to spread the costs of obtaining relief among them.2" Given the reluctance of Congress to appropriate funds for comprehensive, ongoing
enforcement, 0 as well as the political undesirability of total reliance
on the government, attorneys' fee awards were seen as necessary to
safeguard civil rights. Fee-shifting provisions were included in several of the federal civil rights statutes."1 Where attorneys' fees were
not explicitly available, the courts did not hesitate to exercise their
traditional equitable powers to establish a private attorney general
exception to the American rule."2 There was no codification of the
rules for shifting fees in civil rights cases-and no pressing need for
it-until the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service v.
Wilderness Society."'
trative complaint filed in 1973, lawsuit filed in 1977, decision rendered in 1988).
27. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 267.
28. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir.
1986) aff d, 479 U.S. 1048 (1987) (discussing damages for a constitutional claim). See generally Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1269
(1985) (urging the adoption of compensatory remedies for state constitutional interests).
29. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432 n.5 (1983).
30. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 4.
31. See sources cited supra note 2. See generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney
Fee Shifting: A Critical Over'ieu, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651; Note, Pro Se Can You Sue? Attorney
Fees for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1982); Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1984); Attorneys' Fees, 2 W. NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 165 (1979).

32. The Alyeska Court disapproved of this trend:
In recent years, some lower federal courts, erroneously, we think, have employed the private-attorney-general approach to award attorneys' fees. See, e.g.,
Souza v. Travisono, supra; Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (CAI 1974); Knight v.
Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (CAI 1972); Cornist v. Richland Parish School Board,
495 F.2d 189 (CAS 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (CA5 1974);
Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (CA5 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
'444 F.2d 143 (CA5 1971); Taylor v. Perini, supra; Morales v. Haines, 486
F.2d 880 (CA7 1973); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (CA7 1972), cert.
ifenied, 410 U.S. 955; Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (CA8 1974);
Brandenburger v. Thompson, supra; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
The Aleyska Court held that only Congress, and not the courts, could authorize an exception to the American rule. See infra notes 36-38.
33., 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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Legislative History of the Fees Act

In 1975, environmental groups won a lawsuit to bar construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline in Alyeska. In response to their request for attorneys' fees and costs, and absent express statutory authority, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
adopted the private attorney general exception to the American rule.
The United States Supreme Court, while noting that Congress "has
opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public
policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private litigation," ' and citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 5 for
the applicability of that concept to the civil rights context, held that
only Congress could authorize such exceptions.3 6
The decision in Alyeska was widely condemned by commenta37
tors. But it galvanized Congress, which passed the Fees Act in
1976.8 This legislation was not the first effort by Congress to develop a uniform approach to shifting attorneys' fees. In 1973 there
were six days of hearings on the "Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation" during which extensive testimony was
taken on this issue.3 9 In 1975, there were 3 days of hearings, basi34. Id. at 263.
35. 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
36. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263. Note, supra note 2, at 1293 n.5 ("In Alyeska, the Supreme Court rejected this judicially created exception to the 'American Rule' as invading the
legislature's province." Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 271).
37. See, e.g., Comment, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive? 16
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267 (1976); Comment, Alyeska Pipeline Turns Off the Tap: Can
Public Interest Law Survive? 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 239 (1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). As the legislative history noted:
This bill, S.2278, is an appropriate response to the Alyeska decision. It is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws, a category of cases in which
attorneys fees have been traditionally regarded as appropriate. It remedies gaps
in the language of these civil rights laws by providing the specific authorization
required by the Court in Alyeska, and makes our civil rights laws consistent.
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5912. See generally Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 34750 (1980); Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 441 (1977).
It is well settled that "cases arising under our Civil Rights laws" may include cases decided on other grounds. See infra note 49. These "other grounds" may arise under state or
federal law. See infra notes 86-114 (state law); see also infra notes 241-44. But cf. infra notes
118-24 (cases granting fees notwithstanding absence of explicit Civil Rights claim).
39. Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests; 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter 19.73
Hearings];see also Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees inCivil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation, 33 MD. L. REV. 379 (1973).
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cally affirming the earlier proceedings."' During these nine days of
testimony, the question of fee awards in state court proceedings was
essentially ignored. Indeed, Senator Tunney, a champion of the feeshifting legislation, testified in the 1973 hearings: "I don't think the
federal Government ought to be involved in determining what the
'
situation is going to be in state courts." 41
In 1976, there were no hearings. For the first time, however,
there was the political will to get this legislation passed. Not only
had the Alyeska Court thrown down the gauntlet, but Senators Hart
and Scott, long-time civil rights advocates, were retiring from the
Senate. The Senate leadership wanted to honor them with a piece of
significant legislation."' Efforts to derail the bill by filibuster were
thwarted and it was passed in the Senate only two days before the
end of the 1976 session with minimal debate."3 Again, the operation
of the proposed legislation in state courts was not addressed.
The Fees Act was passed by the House on October 1, 1976, the
last day of the session."4 A bill almost identical to the Senate bill had
been reported by the House Judiciary Committee on September 9,
1976, too late for processing. It was placed on the Suspension Calendar, "a procedure usually reserved for the expeditious consideration
of noncontroversial measures."4' 5 Even so, there would not have been
any vote on the bill if the Rules Committee had not convened to
create a special rule the day after the bill passed the Senate. Since
the Republicans were less than enthusiastic about this maneuvering
and refused to attend, the Committee meeting would have lacked a
quorum had not then-Congressman John Anderson broken ranks."
The only reference to state courts in the House debate was
made by Congressman Drinan, who merely noted that the legislation
40. Hearings on Awarding of Attorneys' Fees Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter 1975
Hearings].
41. 1973 Hearings, supra note 39, at 1125.
42. Wolf, Pendent Jurisdiction, Multi-Claim Litigation, and the 1976 Civil Rights
Attorney's Fee Awards Act, 2 W. NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 193, 195-96 n.l (1979).
43. Senator Jesse Helms noted:
We have not had an explanation of the bill, Mr. President, of course. It was
immediately brought up. There was not one word of explanation about it....
I might add also that since this is a substitute, if it should be adopted . . . it
would cut the senate off from any amendment whatsoever on this bill....
Ram it through.
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 28.
44. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 196.
45. SOURCE BooK, supra note 2, at 196 n.12.
46. Telephone interview with Professor Wolf, Western New England College of Law
(Nov. 11, 1988).
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would authorize state as well as federal courts to award fes.4 The
only guidance as to fee awards where litigants prevail dn claims not
subject to fee-shifting statutes,"8 including state court litigants prevailing on state claims, appears in footnote 7 of the House Report
submitted in support of the bill. The State Claims Tests are set forth
for the first time in this footnote:
To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of the statutes
enumerated in H.R. 15460 with a claim that does not allow
attorneys fees, that plaintiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim,
is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose
of awarding counsel fees. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th
Cir. 1973). In some instances, however, the claim with fees may
involve a constitutional question which the courts are reluctant
to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is dispositive. . . . In
such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded meets
the 'substantiality' test, see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.. 528
(1974) attorney's fees may be allowed even though the court
declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that claim, so long
as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee claim arising out of a
'common nucleus of operative fact.' United Mineworkers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)." 9
The two State Claims Tests (the Morales test for statutory
claims and the Hagans/Gibbstest for fee claims "involving a constitutional question") were an afterthought, an eleventh hour addition."' According to Professor Arthur Wolf, one of the coauthors of
the State Claims Tests,"' the purpose of footnote' 7 was to indicate
47. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 253. In 1976, it was less unthinkable to bring civil
rights actions in certain state courts. See Friesen, supra note 28, at nn.4-7. Moreover, after
seven years of the Burger Court, some civil rights claimants were finding that the doors to the
federal house were swinging shut. See Hyman, supra note 21, at 984-85 (1984); Cf., THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
48. Hereinafter, claims which are not directly covered by fee-shifting statutes are referred to as "non-fee claims," and claims which are subject to such statutes are referred to as
"fee claims."
49. H.R. REP. No. 94-1558 (1976).
50. See generally Rothfeld, Judging Law: Never Mind What Congress Meant? N.Y.
Times, Apr. 14, 1989, at B5, col. 3 (noting that "an increasingly vocal group of federal judges
• . . [argue] that legislative history has become an unreliable guide to Congressional intent"
and quoting Professor Stephen Ross, who attributes controversy, at least in part, to the fact
that "conservative Republican judges are interpreting law passed by a Democratic Congress.");
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
51. Professor Wolf was special counsel to Congressman Robert Drinan, floor manager
of the bill. Wolf, supra note 42, at 193, 196 n.14. Mary Frances Derfner was the other coauthor. Ms. Derfner wrote Attorneys' Fees in Pro Bono Publico Cases: A Compilation of
Federal Court Cases, reprinted in Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of
Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate
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clearly that fees should be available even if there was not an explicit,
favorable decision on the fee claim. It was plain under earlier case
law that fees could be available when there had been no adjudication.52 The drafters of footnote 7 were concerned, however, that
courts might construe the legislative silence as a disavowal if awards
under such circumstances were not expressly addressed. They
thought that courts might hesitate to grant fees on a claim that had
not been proven where other claims had actually been litigated."3
The intent behind footnote 7 was admirable but like many eleventh hour inspirations, it needed work. The footnote may well have
been improved, or abandoned, had it been subject to the full and
rigorous debate that would typically be generated by such a proposition. Because of the circumstances of its passage, however, it evaded
this process. As explained below, footnote 7 hinders the civil rights
plaintiffs it was meant to benefit, in part because the tests set forth
in the footnote have confused the courts.
C.

Availability of Fees for State Claimants in State Courts Today

State courts may now be the preferred forum for certain kinds
of civil rights litigation."4 If the Burger Court was considered less
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 3 & 4, 862-1107 (1974). Ms. Derfner also
assisted in the preparation of the SOURcE BooK, supra note 2.
52. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Fogg v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.C.N.H. 1972) (female former employee
entitled to fees because she performed valuable public service by instituting action, although
she did not show that she was personally discriminated against). Cf Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d
219, 220-21 (1st Cir. 1974) (noting in dicta that it is appropriate to grant fees to encourage
settlement). See also text accompanying infra notes 214-22.
53. Telephone interview with Professor Wolf, supra note 46.
54. See generally Note, Developments in the LawThe Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1982); Neisser, Celebrating the Bicentennial by Going
to State Court, 1987 N.J. LAw. 44 n.19. Indeed, state courts may be the only realistic forum.
See Comment, ProtectingFundamental Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. Civ. RTs.-Civ. LIABILITY L. REV. 63, 64 (1977) (arguing that restric-

tive standing decisions of the Burger court effectively deny civil right plaintiffs access). But cf.
Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationalefor PendentJurisdiction,
75 Nw. U.L. REV. 245, 270 (1980) (noting the role of the federal courts as the "primary
vindicators of federal rights").
Even if state courts may be the better forum now, this was certainly not the case when the
13th, 14th and 15th amendments were passed by the reconstruction congress. See Note, Developments in the Law Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1182 (1977).
The point is that the receptivity of state and federal courts will vary depending on the times
and the cases. As then Professor Frankfurter noted, "A division of judicial labor among different courts, particularly between a dual system of federal and state courts, is especially subject
to the shifting needs of time and circumstance." Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 503. To maximize the opportunities for the vindication of civil rights, both state and federal courts should be
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hospitable to civil rights claimants than its predecessor, the Warren
Court, the Rehnquist Court is perceived as downright hostile. Indeed, its unprecedented, sua sponte decision to reconsider Runyon v.
McCrary" in connection with Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,"
not only outraged the civil rights community, but drew sharp condemnation from a moderate Congress as well. 7 The Court's decision
in City of Richmond v. Croson," which places a hefty burden on
affirmative action plans to demonstrate that they do not unjustly discriminate against whites, can only confirm the apprehensions of its
critics." Considered in conjunction with Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,60 and Martin v. Wilkes,"' these decisions "make discrimination suits harder to bring, harder to win and more vulnerable to
attack if successfully concluded," 62 and have left "[clivil rights leaders . . . reeling." 6 The perception is widespread that the lower federal courts are similarly unsympathetic to civil rights plaintiffs."'
State courts, in striking contrast, are viewed as increasingly receptive to civil rights claims. There have been notable advances in
the law on the state level, particularly in the more progressive
states.65 State law, whether statutory or constitutional, may well proavailable to those seeking to promote or defend civil rights.
55. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
56. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988). Although the Court unanimously refused to overrule Runyon, it held 5-4 that section 1981 does not apply to on-the-job racial harassment.
57. On June 24, 1988 an amicus brief was filed, signed by 67 U.S. senators and 119
U.S. representatives, urging the Court to uphold its decision in Runyon. Brief for Amici Senators and Members of the House in Support of Petitioner, Patterson V. McLean Credit Union,
108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (No. 87-107).
58. 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989).
59. But see Even So, Affirmative Action Lives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at A22, col.
1 (Richmond "leaves room for affirmative action that is carefully constructed.")
60. 110 S. Ct. 38 (1989).
61. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). (white employees who were not parties to employment discrimination suit settled by consent decree were not barred from later challenging its terms).
62. Greenhouse, A Changed Court Revises Rules on Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, June
18, 1989, § 4 (Week in Rev.), col. 1. See also Court's 'Redefining' Worries Rights Groups,
Nat'l L.J., June 26, 1989, at 5, col. I (noting that majority in Patterson redefined scope of
section 1981); but see Bork, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights, Wall St. J., June 30, 1989,
at A12 (arguing that the "morality of process [demonstrated by the Court] is the highest morality of the jurist").
63. Greenhouse, supra note 62; accord Coyle, How Far Will the Court Go? Nat'l L.J.,
June 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1. See also Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.
1986) (section 1981 does not authorize damage suits against state and local governments).
64. See generally H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988); Professor Schwartz has been criticized for
assuming "the rightness of liberal jurisprudence[.]" Taylor, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 1988, § 7, at 33.
65. Frequently cited examples include New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin. The
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vide a better basis for relief." Even if favorable precedent has not
yet been established, state law may offer the possibility of more creative approaches to intransigent civil rights problems.67 The New
Jersey Supreme Court, for example, found a right to equal education under the New Jersey Constitution in Robinson v. Cahill. 8
This inspired fair housing advocates to include an analogous state
constitutional claim in the landmark Mt. Laurel litigation.6 9 State
civil rights claims often raise novel questions of state law, moreover,
which a federal court is unlikely to decide. 7 ' Even where federal
court is a viable option, state courts may be less congested, state
judges more sympathetic or state jurisdictional requirements less
stringent. For all of these reasons, state courts are an increasingly
likely choice for civil rights claimants. 1
The Supreme Court has similarly acknowledged the importance
characterization, of course, varies according to the issue. See generally B. McGRAW, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985);

M.

PORTER

& G. TARR, STATE SU-

(1982).
66. See Note, supra note 54, at 1180 & n.266; Payne, The Bicentennial, Constitutionalisin and the States, N.J. LAW. Aug. 1987, at 10, 11 (noting the utilization by state courts of
"far-ranging substantive due process doctrines that have not proven workable in the federal
system"); Neisser, supra note 54, at 42, 43 (discussing possible advantages of state constitutional litigation and noting that "for the vast bulk of our history, the people depended for their
liberty upon their state constitutions"). See Wolf, supra note 42, at 242 (discussing creative
alternatives offered by state law).
But see Rapaczynski, supra note 6, at 408-09 (criticizing the notion of the states as "laboratories of experiment[,]" as "one of the least examined verities of constitutional theory[,]" and
arguing that even if decentralization did "contribute to governmental efficiency," the ways in
which it might most constructively do so requires a "very complex and largely pragmatic"
PREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

determination, "unsuitable

... for elevation to the constitutional

level or for judicial

assessment")
67. See supra note 54. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). See also Stevens, Rights Group Hails
Toward Enforcing Civil Liberties, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1987, at A13 (disNational Shift
cussing the relatively progressive recent decisions of certain state courts in civil liberties cases).
See generally Falk, Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than 'Adequate' Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 272, 281-82 (1973) (arguing that a state may freely invalidate
state legislation as violative of the state constitution, regardless of federal constitutional precedent); Relkin & Solomon, Using State Constitutions to Expand Public Funding for Abortions: Throwing Away the Carrot with the Stick, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 27 (1986).
68. 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975).
69. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
70. Under the second, discretionary step in the jurisdictional analysis mandated by
United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the court should generally leave pendent
state claims raising novel questions of state law to the "surer-footed" state courts. Id. at726.
See generally Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
71. Cf Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 519 (noting the desirability of having "the special
local facts upon which constitutional questions now so frequently turn . . .canvassed [in the
first instance] by [state court] judges presumably most familiar with them.").
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of the availability of state forums, requiring state courts to hear certain federal claims even where contrary to state law.72 But as the
courts, Congress and scholars have noted, the availability of attorneys' fees will in many cases determine whether a forum is truly
available to civil rights claimants. If fees are not available in state
court, plaintiffs may be effectively precluded from utilizing their forum of choice. As a corollary, they may be deterred from relying on
those "novel" state laws which are likely to trigger abstention on the
part of a federal court. Thus, the circumstances under which attorneys' fees may be recoverable in state courts becomes a critically important issue, not only for civil rights lawyers and their clients, but
for the development of the law.
The growing utilization of state courts has resulted in the correspondingly extensive reliance on footnote 7 of the House bill, which
sets forth the State Claims Tests. These tests may have been an afterthought in 1976, but they seem prescient in today. Despite their
flaws, the clear indication of legislative support for the principle that
fees should be available in state courts has been invaluable for civil
rights claimants.
The next part describes the State Claims Tests and their role in
determining the availability of attorneys' fees for plaintiffs who prevail on state claims in state court. These tests have served their purpose; the principle that fees should be available in state court for
civil rights claimants who prevail on state grounds is now well established. It will be shown how the State Claims Tests, as interpreted
and applied by the state courts, have come to frustrate litigants seeking to avail themselves of the benefits of the civil rights fee-shifting
statutes in state courts. By doing so, the tests contravene the federal
scheme for the full, vigorous and creative enforcement of civil rights.
IV.
A.

THE STATE CLAIMS TESTS

What They Are

The State Claims Tests are used to determine whether an
award of attorneys' fees may be granted in an action involving both a
claim under the federal civil rights fee-shifting statutes and a non-fee
claim, when the case is resolved on the basis of the non-fee claim and
72. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386(1947); M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note
6, at 14-13, 14-14 & n.5 (noting that "the United States Supreme Court has reserved the
question whether state courts must hear cases based on Section 1983.") (citing Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.7 (1980)).
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there is no ruling with respect to the fee claim.7"
There are actually two State Claims Tests. Which test is used
74
depends on the nature of the federal fee claim, at least in theory.
Where the federal claim is statutory, such as a Title VIII claim, the
plaintiff is entitled to a determination of her claim under the
Morales test, solely for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees. 75 In
Morales, a black plaintiff who had contracted to buy a federally subsidized house sued city officials to enjoin them from preventing its
construction within city limits. She was awarded injunctive relief,
but denied damages and attorneys' fees. The Seventh Circuit held
that she would be entitled to fees and damages if she could establish
racial discrimination and that the case should be remanded to give
her an opportunity to do so.
Hagans/Gibbs is the second State Claims Test. It is supposed
to be applied where the federal fee claim "involves a constitutional
question." Hagans/Gibbs was originally a test 'for determining
whether a federal court could assert jurisdiction over a pendent state
claim. Since it requires only that the federal claim be "substantial"
(Hagans)and that the federal and state claims arise out of a "common nucleus of operative facts" (Gibbs), Hagans/Gibbs as a jurisdictional test 7" assures liberal access to federal courts for claimants
73. The State Claims Tests are set forth at supra text accompanying note 49. These
tests would apply to federal, as well as state, non-fee claims, but we are focusing on non-fee
state claims here. The State Claims Tests are frequently applied in federal court, in connection
with non-fee federal claims as well as pendant state claims. At least 13 of the state courts have
adopted the tests in reported decisions, and only one state court has considered the State
Claims Tes1§ and failed to adopt them. See infra note 83 (states which have followed the tests);
Caputo v. Chicago, 446 N.E.2d 1240, 113 I11.App. 3d 45 (1983) (rejecting test in dicta). In
federal courts, the tests are less problematic since "by the time the case concludes, [the federal
court] will have already applied [them] in taking jurisdiction over the pendent claim at the
onset of the litigation." M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 6. See, e.g., Exeter-West
Greenwich Regional School Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1986); Elbe v. Yankton
Indep. School Dist., 640 F. Supp. 1234 (D.S.D. 1986).
Fees in connection with non-fee state claims were expressly contemplated by Congress.
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 253. In some states, such as California, the state claim may
also be a "fee claim" in that fees may be allowable under state law absent the federal fee
shifting statute. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1982). ("Attorney fees: enforcement of
important rights affecting public interest."). See also infra note 282.
74. It may be difficult, or otherwise undesirable, to distinguish between a constitutional
claim and a statutory claim in this context. This suggests the expedience of a single test. See
infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
75. Morales was among the lower federal court opinions explicitly disclaimed by the
Al'yesha Court. See supra note 31.
76. Pendent jurisdiction cannot be asserted unless the article III requirement that the
state and federal claims comprise one constitutional "case" is satisfied. There is authority for
the transactional view of "cases" under article III. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Schenkier, supra
note 54, at 272 & n.140. But cf. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillarvy and
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suing under the fee-shifting statutes. By adopting Hagans/Gibbs,
the drafters7" of the State Claims Tests intended to afford the
broadest opportunity for the application of these statutes. 8 Where a
plaintiff claims a denial of due process under Section 1983, for example, fees may be granted under the Fees Act if the federal constitutional claim is (1) "rubstantial" within the meaning of Hagans v.
Lavine79 and, (2) the federal claim and the state claim on which
plaintiff prevailed arise from "a common nucleus of operative facts,"
80
as set forth in United Mineworkers v. Gibbs.
Hagans/Gibbs, unlike Morales, does not require a ruling with
respect to the fee claim. Indeed, the purpose of the test is to discourage the otherwise unnecessary determination of constitutional questions. This is known as the "avoidance doctrine." Although generally
adhered to by the federal courts, it is a policy of judicial construction
rather than an ironclad rule. As we shall see, its acceptance among
the state courts is far from universal.81
Both State Claims Tests are quoted in their entirety in most of
the cases addressing the question of fee awards for plaintiffs prevailing on non-fee claims, including the Supreme Court's oft-cited decision in Maher v. Gagne.8 2
B.

Interpretationof the State Claims Tests by the State Courts

1. An Overview-Why Are the State Claims Tests Interpreted
at all?
There are reported decisions, most of which cite the State
Claims Tests in their entirety, from at least 13 of the state courts.83
It is surprising that so many of the states have adopted some version
Pendentjurisdiction, 33 U. PiTT. L. REV. 759, 765 (1971-72) (relating the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to the concept of "case" in the Rules, but suggesting that that concept is "far
broader and more flexible than is the phrase 'common nucleus of operative fact.' ").
77. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53 for an account of the origins of the tests.
78. But see Comment, Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees in Cases Resolved on State Pendent
and Federal Statutory Grounds, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 488, 495-97 (1981-82) (arguing that
Congress' intent in this regard, especially as shown in the senate history, is "far from clear").
For a doctrinal analysis of Hagans/Gibbs, see infra notes 169-90 and accompanying text.
79. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
80. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). As the court explained in Stratos v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 439 N.E.2d 778, 783 (1982): "The [Hagans/Gibbs]rule is a compromise
between accurate application of § 1983 and § 1988, and traditional policy of refraining from
unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions."
81. M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 6, at 14-20.
82. 448 U.S. 122, 132-33 n.15 (1980). See infra notes 85-86.
83. New York, Massachusetts, California, Delaware, Maryland, Maine, Alabama,
Kansas, Oregon, Indiana, Arkansas, Arizona and the District of Columbia.
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of the State Claims Tests since a strong argument can be made that
their adoption by the state courts is not compelled by law. The State
Claims Tests were merely a footnote in the House Report accompanying the bill. They were never actually incorporated in the legislation. Even as a statement of legislative intent, they are of dubious
significance since they were never mentioned during the debate.84
Nor is the Supreme Court's citation of the State Claims Tests
in footnote 1586 of its decision in Maher v. Gagne controlling. Footnote 15 is mere dicta in Maher. Although both a Section 1983 fee
claim and a non-fee claim under the Social Security Act were raised
in that case, the matter was settled by the parties. The award of fees
was predicated on the relief obtained by the plaintiff. The Court's
observation that fees would have been allowable had the plaintiff
prevailed on her non-fee Social Security claim was not part of the
holding. There is nothing in Maher, moreover, suggesting that the
State Claims Tests should be applied by a state court when the nonfee claim arises under state law. 86
Although state courts could have rejected the State Claims
Tests, none have explicitly done so. 87 Instead, they have uniformly
failed to consider the arguments noted above, any one of which could
have justified nonapplication of the State Claims Tests. Indeed, the
84. The Report was distributed on September 15, 1976, presumably permitting adequate time for review prior to the house debate on October 1, 1976. SOURCE BOOK, supra note
2, at 209, 235. It appears that the Senate, on the other hand, did not have the opportunity to
study the Report prior to its vote. See supra note 43.
85. Maher, 448 U.S. at 132-33 n.15 (1980).
86. Cf Anderson v. Redman, 474 F. Supp. 511, 515 (1979): "This Court agrees with at
least three Courts of Appeals that . . . [the State Claims Tests set forth at footnote 7 of the
House Report] present as strong an indication of congressional intent on the question as could
reasonably be expected." (citing, without further explanation, Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336,
340 (2d Cir. 1979); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423, 426-27 (8th Cir.
1978); Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 1977)). The court proceeded to reject defendant's contention that fee awards for plaintiffs prevailing on state grounds
was "an improper exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" citing the Supreme Court's decision in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 698 (1978)
(Congress intended to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity in enacting the Fees
Act). Anderson, 474 F. Supp. at 516.
It could be argued that the State Claims Tests should apply where plaintiff brings a
federal fee claim and a federal non-fee claim in state court, prevailing on the latter. Such cases
are likely to be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, however, and in fact there
are no reported state court decisions involving such claims. Of course, any civil rights matter
may be removed under the cited provision regardless of the nature of the non-fee claim, but
removal is more likely where the second claim also arises under federal law. See generally
Redish, Revitalizing Civil Rights Renoval Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1980).
87. But see Caputo v. Chicago, 113 Il1. App. 3d 45, 446 N.E.2d 1240, 1242 (1983)
(rejecting test in dicta).
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court observed in Filipino Accountants v. State Board of Accountancy,88 that "[w]e know of no principle that would allow us to disregard these views of the highest court of the land. Where the Supreme
Court of the United States interprets a statute enacted by the Congress, that interpretation is binding upon the state courts of California." The force of this statement belies the several leaps that the
California court, like all the state courts, had to take in determining
that dicta appearing in a footnote, in an easily distinguishable context, amounted to a binding " interpretation." Why did the California court, and the twelve other state courts, do so?
While the statecourts may not have been compelled by the law
to follow the State Claims Tests, powerful inducements for the adoption of the tests were provided by the growing numbers of civil rights
actions being brought in state court and the sense that such claimants
should be as entitled to fees as their federal court counterparts. As
the drafters of the State Claims Tests expected, explicit authorization
for such awards was welcomed by state courts attempting to apply
unfamiliar federal law. The tests were a road sign on an otherwise
unmarked expanse. The State Claims Tests were relied on without
question by state courts seeking to do equity where the plaintiff
plainly vindicated her civil rights, even though she only prevailed on
her non-fee state claim. The fundamental illogic of the tests, and the
resultant problems in applying them, were viewed as technical difficulties. In practice, many states have already modified the State
Claims Tests so that they are scarcely recognizable, although these
states continue to cite the tests in their original form.
2.

Merger of the State Claims Tests

The states which cite the State Claims Tests typically cite both
9 ° prongs.
the Morales8 9 and the Hagans/Gibbs
There is rarely any
attempt to specify which test is to be applied, and there is correspondingly little differentiation between statutory fee claims (which
technically should trigger Morales) and constitutional fee claims
(which call for Hagans/Gibbs). There are basically three reasons
for this blurring of the State Claims Tests. First, it is a practical
consequence of the way in which state civil rights suits are usually
structured. Second, it reflects the underlying doctrinal fuzziness between constitutional and statutory claims in the civil rights context.
88. 155 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 1034, 204 Cal. Rptr. 913, 919 (1984).
89. See supra text accompanying note 71.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
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Third, there are compelling policy reasons for treating constitutional
and statutory civil rights claims alike for purposes of fee awards.
There is also some textual support for this interpretation.
a. Practical Considerations
Since the enactment of the Fees Act, constitutional claims are
routinely appended to claims brought under the civil rights statutes
so as to maximize the possibility of a fee award. (Such practice, of
course, also increases the likelihood of a favorable decision on the
merits.) If the case involves discrimination in housing, for example,
the complaint will usually include constitutional claims under the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments as well as a statutory claim
under Title VIII.9 1 In order to prove her constitutional claim, plain-k
tiff must demonstrate intentional discrimination. 92 Title VIII merely
requires a showing of "discriminatory effect." Thus, even if plaintiff
cannot prove intent, she may prevail under Title VIII.9 3 On the
other hand, she may be able to show intent to discriminate, and
thereby be entitled to fees based on her constitutional claims, but fail
to satisfy Title VIII's requirement that she be unable to pay her own
legal expenses. 9 ' Prudent counsel, accordingly, typically includes'
both types of claims in the complaint. As a result, when a plaintiff
prevails on her state claim, there is often no adverse decision with
respect to either her federal statutory or constitutional claim. Neither
the legislative history nor the case law provide any guidance for the
court as to which of the two State Claims Tests9" should apply in
this situation.
b.

Doctrinal Fuzziness

As a doctrinal matter, the distinction between a statutory and a
constitutional fee claim is spurious in this context because the statu91.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).

92. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
93. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974); United
Farmworkers, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971); Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 651, 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1180 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nora. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
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tory claim necessarily embraces a constitutional claim.96 Indeed, the
constitution is at the very core of claims advanced under the civil
rights statutes. As the Court noted in U.S. v. City of Black Jack,
Missouri,97 the purpose of the civil rights statutes is to enforce the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. The Black Jack Court saw
no more reason, at least for purposes of abstention, for denying a
federal forum to a plaintiff relying on Title VIII than for denying a
federal forum to a plaintiff alleging a constitutional claim.98 The
Court treated a claim under the Civil Rights Act like a constitutional
claim. Similarly, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer" the Supreme Court held
that, for the purposes of sovereign immunity, a claim under Title
VII should be considered tantamount to a constitutional claim.
Under Bitzer and its progeny, civil rights claimants may obtain recovery from the state which would otherwise be barred by the eleventh amendment.
In Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare,'0° the court
pointed out a further source of doctrinal obscurity in the context of
distinguishing statutory and constitutional claims:
The full reach of Sec. 1983 as a remedy for statutory violations
is not yet clear. The Supreme Court has held that Sec. 1983
encompasses violations of statutory as well as constitutional provisions, and has rejected the view that statutory Sec. 1983 actions must be based on 'civil rights' legislation.'
The Thiboutot Court refused to distinguish between statutory
and constitutional claims for purposes of awards under the Fees Act,
without suggesting that the two kinds of claims might be subject to
different proofs. 1'
c.

Policy Considerations

The underlying policy reasons for avoiding otherwise unnecessary statutory determinations in this context may well be as compel96. See County Executive v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 454 n.13, 479 A.2d 352, 360 n.13
(1984) (referring to "federal civil rights claims" presumably embracing statutory and constitutional claims).
97. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975), reh'g denied,
423 U.S. 884 (1975).
98. Id. at 1184.
99. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
100. 387 Mass. 312, 439 N.E.2d 778 (1982).
101. Id. at 316, 439 N.E.2d at 782 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980)).
102. "Since we hold that this statutory action is properly brought under § 1983, and
since § 1988 makes no exception for statutory 1983 actions, § 1988 plainly applies to this
suit." Thibontot, 448 U.S. at 9.
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ling as the reasons for avoiding constitutional determinations. In the
Mount Laurel litigation, for example, the determination of the statutory Title VIII claim would have required a finding as to whether
the defendant municipalities engaged in racial discrimination. Although such a finding would reflect a lower standard of proof under
Title VIII than it would under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, 10 8 voters would be unlikely to pay much attention to such fine
distinctions and the political consequences would be the same. In any
case, a determination of racial discrimination would make no difference to the parties, since the New Jersey Supreme Court had already granted all of the relief, on state constitutional grounds, which
could have been awarded under the federal constitution."0 Such adjudications, furthermore, may be especially undesirable since state
05
courts will often be called upon to interpret unsettled federal law.'
Finally, it could be argued that the text of the State Claims
Tests fails to establish a clear statutory/constitutional dichotomy.
Rather than making a bright-line distinction between statutory and
constitutional claims, the State Claims Tests differentiate between
statutory claims and claims which "may involve a constitutional
question which the courts are reluctant to resolve." This formulation
leaves a court with considerable latitude to determine, first; whether
a constitutional question is "involved," and second; whether it is "reluctant" to resolve it. As shown in Black Jack and Bitzer, a constitutional question may be "involved" without being explicitly presented.
A court may well be "reluctant" to decide a question even though it
technically has the power to do so. The ambiguity of the text leaves
state courts with substantial discretion, but very little guidance as to
its exercise.
There is little practical, policy, doctrinal or textual justification
for making what may be a very subtle distinction between a statutory and a constitutional claim. In general, state courts have sensibly
not .attempted to do so. At least as applied in state court, the tests
have functionally merged. The question then becomes one of formu103. Title VIII merely requires a showing of "disparate impact" while the constitution
may require evidence of intent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982); see supra notes 91-03.
104. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) ("Mt.
Laurel II").
105. Indeed, the court may well have relied on state grounds precisely to avoid such a
determination. Why should plaintiff be awarded a fee if it is not clear as a matter of law that
she could have prevailed on federal grounds? First, as discussed more fully below (see infra
text accompanying notes 246-54), the focus should be on whether she could have obtained the
relief granted under state law had she prevailed on her federal claim. Second, defendant always has the option of litigating the federal claim, by moving to dismiss it at the trial level.
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lating the test to be applied to determine entitlement to fees in the
resultant category of cases.
3. Morales and Morales-like Determinations of
Constitutional Questions
Under Morales v. Haines,1" 6 a plaintiff is entitled to a determination of her statutory fee claim for purposes of deciding whether
she may be granted attorneys' fees. Even though the underlying dispute has been resolved, the court is required to rule on the fee claim.
Where the record is inadequate, as it was in Morales, plaintiff is
entitled to a remand.
There have been no reported remands by state courts under
Morales since the enactment of the Fees Act. This may be attributable to two factors; first, the tremendous cost and the limited utility of
a proceeding solely to determine entitlement to fees; and, second, the
routine inclusion of constitutional claims falling under the Fees Act
in civil rights litigation. As noted above, constitutional questions trigger an analysis under the Hagans/Gibbs prong of the State Claims
Tests, and such an analysis does not require a determination of the
constitutional fee claim. Indeed, the point of Hagans/Gibbs is to
permit fee awards while avoiding such determinations. Although
state courts explicitly cite Hagans/Gibbs, several of them have nonetheless adopted a Morales approach in these cases, addressing the
merits of the constitutional fee claim solely for purposes of deciding
whether or not to grant fees. This is typically justified on the theory
that such a Morales-type determination is necessary to ascertain the
"substantiality" of the constitutional claim within the meaning of
Hagans. Other state courts, while not actually deciding the constitutional claim, have engaged in a far more detailed Morales-like consideration of the merits of the claim than that which is contemplated
by the Hagans test.
a.

The State Cases

In Jackson v. Inhabitants of the Town of Searsport,1 °7 for example, the defendant municipality failed to take any action on the
plaintiff's application for public assistance within the twenty-four
hours required by the applicable Maine statute and local ordinance.
The plaintiff filed suit, 'alleging violation of the fourteenth amend106.
107.

486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973).
456 A.2d 852 (Me. 1983).
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ment as well as state law. The trial court, without specifying the
grounds, granted the plaintiff's demand for injunctive relief and ordered the town to act on his application. The trial court denied the
plaintiff's application for attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Court cited Hagans/Gibbs but pointed out the difficulty of
applying it in the context of a post-judgment fee application. The
court noted that the Hagans standard is a "threshold test for getting
into federal court," that is, a test made prospectively at the inception
of the litigation, and observed that, "[girafting the Hagans standard
onto the necessarily retrospective inquiry of whether a party has pre1 8
vailed for purposes of section 1988 has scant support in logic." "
The court was simply not persuaded that the mere fact that a fee
claim might have been a sustainable basis for jurisdiction justified a
fee award without a more rigorous analysis of that claim. While
purporting to address only the "substantiality" of the plaintiffis constitutional claim, the court effectively decided its merits.
In Slawik v. State,0 9 similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court
reached the merits of plaintiff's constitutional claim under the guise
of determining its "substantiality." After the reversal of a conviction
which had resulted in Slawik's removal from the office of county
executive, plaintiff sought damages under state law and the federal
constitution, claiming deprivation of a property interest in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Citing the
State Claims Tests, the Slawik court offered the baffling explanation
that it was necessary to decide the merits of the plaintiff's federal
constitutional claim in order to determine its substantiality because
0
the constitutional question was one of first impression." It appears
well-established, however, that such questions would be considered
"substantial" under the Hagans jurisdictional test since it is their
very openness which makes it appropriate for the court to address
them. Since some jurisdictions had adopted the view of property
rights on which the plaintiff's argument relied, it seems apparent
that the plaintiff's claim could have withstood a motion for dismissal
108. Id. at 855 n.13.
109. 480 A.2d 636 (Del. 1984).
110.
Whether in Delaware a public official has a constitutionally cognizable 'property' interest in his elected post is a question of first impression for this Court.
Having considered the various federal and state decisions, we hold today that a
public officer in this state takes his position under the aegis and for the benefit
of the public, subject to suspension or removal by any constitutionally permissible means.
Id. at 644.
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on the grounds of insubstantiality had it been brought in federal
court. As another state court has explained:
In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims are
constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions render
the claims frivolous .. .only if 'its unsoundness so clearly re-

sults from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the
subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions
sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy. "
Contrary to the Slawik court's reasoning, it is only where the question is "no longer open to discussion" that it is deemed "insubstantial" under Hagans."2 The plaintiff's federal constitutional claim
should have been considered "substantial" precisely because it was
unsettled and therefore "open to discussion" in Delaware.
The Slawik decision is particularly striking because the court
was well aware of the foregoing precedent, much of which it had
cited. " ' The Slawik court, like the Searsport court, was frustrated
by the lack of a coherent rationale in the State Claims Tests. It must
have been clear to the court that Slawik satisfied the "painstakingly
minimal standard of substantiality defined in Hagans."" 4 But it was
equally plain that fees should not be granted if the relief obtained
under state law would not have been available under the federal fee
claim. Thus, the Slawik court felt compelled to decide whether plaintiff could have achieved the same result under his federal constitutional theory, although the issue should not have been reached under
the avoidance doctrine." 5 In County Executive, Prince George's Co.
v. Doe, " 6 the Maryland Court of Appeals suggests the inevitable
erosion of the avoidance doctrine under the State Claims Tests.
While correctly applying the tests, the court urged the lower courts
111. Filipino Accountants v. State Bd. of Accounting, 155 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 1034, 204
Cal. Rptr. 913, 919 (1984) (citing Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537-38).
112. Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537.
113. Slawik, 480 A.2d at 636, 641. Cf County Executive v. Doe, 300 Md. 444, 479
A.2d 352 (1984) (finding that plaintiffs fee claim should be considered "insubstantial" because, "[in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Poelker v. Doe, the unsoundness of the
plaintiff's Section 1983 ground for relief in this case is absolutely clear." Id. at 361 (citations
omitted)).
114. Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 439 N.E.2d 778, 784
(1982). For a description of the Hagans test in the fees context, see infra notes 169-75 and
accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. As explained in part V, this is
probably the result that would be reached, albeit less laboriously, under the prevailing party
test.
116. 300 Md. 444, 479 A.2d 352 (1984).
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in future cases to "consider" deciding the federal civil rights issue if
"it can be decided relatively easily in light of higher court
decisions."1'17
This approach reaches its nadir in those cases where the court
sifts through the record to find some basis for a fee claim that could
have been made, although it was not. Fees are then predicated on
that "phantom" claim. In Viglietta v. Blum,"' for example, the
plaintiff brought a writ of mandamus challenging the Department of
Social Services' policy of denying benefits to certain otherwise entitled claimants unless they commenced mandamus proceedings in accordance with New York state law."' The plaintiff challenged this
policy on equal protection grounds. The court correctly held that the
plaintiff lacked standing, since claimants who failed to file mandamus proceedings, unlike the plaintiff, were the only ones denied relief. Because the plaintiff was clearly vindicating a significant right,
the Viglietta court strained to find a justification for a fee award.
Fees were awarded on the ground that petitioner "may have had a
valid and substantial federal claim premised on both federal statutory and constitutional grounds, not on the grounds he argues, but
upon the ground of unjustifiable administrative delay. '120 The court
proceeded to find that on the record, the plaintiff could have shown a
violation of the federal social security statute 2' as well as the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, although neither argument was raised. In Viglietta, the court made Morales-type determiargument,
nations of both a statutory claim and a constitutional
22
plaintiff.1
by
advanced
ever
was
neither of which
28
In Maldonado v. Nebraska Department of Public Welfare,
117. Id. at 460 n.13, 479 A.2d at 360 n.13.
118. 108 Misc. 2d 516, 437 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981); see also Johnson v. Blum, 58 N.Y.2d
454, 457 & n.2, 448 N.E.2d 449, 450 & n.2 (1983) (New York's highest court adopts Hagans / Gibbs test).
119. Viglietta, 108 Misc. 2d at 520, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
120. Id.
121. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a)(8) (1972).
122. This is particularly surprising because the case was settled, and neither of the State
Claims Tests should have been triggered. The court, moreover, introduces a variant of the
proper test: "(lit does not matter which claim [fee or non-feel induced the settlement or would
have been successful at trial as long as the fee claim is substantial and arises from the same
operative facts as the non-fee claim." Viglietta, 108 Misc. 2d at 516, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 629
(citing Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979)). "Similarly, where the action proceeds
to trial, counsel fees may be awarded even where relief is premised on non-fee grounds provided the decision could have been premised on a violation of federal law or the federal constitution." Id. (citing Holley v. Blum, 75 A.D.2d 998, 429 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1980); McNeil v.
Shang, 69 A.D.2d 985, 416 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1979)).
123. 223 Neb. 485, 391 N.W.2d 105 (1986).

1990]

CIVIL RIGHTS FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES

529

similarly, plaintiff Maldonado was awarded fees although she had
never alleged any claim under a fee-shifting statute. Maldonado's
welfare grant had been incorrectly calculated. On appeal, the court
agreed with the plaintiff that the agency below had erred. The court
further held that, "even though Maldonado's petition did not expressly state that it was brought under Section 1983, 'the allegations
of the petition relate to deprivation of constitutional rights which
would permit attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 1988. '''124 The
court rejected defendants' argument that since they had no notice of
any Section 1983 claim, they had no opportunity to counter it. The
court distinguished Ingram v. Moody, 12 in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that in the absence of an express claim or of any
indication that the action was tried on Section 1983 grounds, there
could be no fees awarded under Section 1988. Rather, the Maldonado court held that under Nebraska's system of pleading, "the facts
well pled, and not the theory of recovery, state the cause of action." 26 In any case, the court continued, the final order indicated
that the matter was decided under a Section 1983 theory.'12 Under
this line of cases, as the Court in Guardianshipof Hurley2 8 succinctly observed: "A complaint need not mention explicitly the underlying statute as long as the elements of a cause of action are
pleaded."' 2 9
There are grave due process problems with this approach, despite the Maldonado court's airy dismissal of such concerns. Moreover, it is clearly inconsistent with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in North Carolina Department of Transportation
v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc.'80 that, "only a court in an
action to enforce one of the civil rights laws,"'' could award fees.
What is striking here is the courts' willingness to ignore what
they plainly consider technical obstacles in order to reach what they
feel is a fair result. Courts which are prepared to dispense with notice to defendants of the claim against them are not likely to be
124. Id. at 487, 391 N.W.2d at 107.
125. 382 So. 2d 522 (Ala. 1980).
126. Maldonado, 223 Neb. at 489, 391 N.W.2d at 108.
127. Id. at 492, 391 N.W.2d at 109. Other cases holding that express citation of section
1983 is not required for an award under section 1988 include Fairbanks Correctional Center
v. Williamson, 600 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1979); Stanton v. Godfrey, 415 N.E.2d 103 (1981),
Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 231 Kan. 507, 646 P.2d 1078 (1982).
128. 394 Mass. 554, 559, 476 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1985).
129. Id. at559, 476 N.E.2d at 945.
130. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
131. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). See infra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
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overly concerned with the niceties of the State Claims Tests. Such
courts may well be inclined to reject those tests in favor of the more
substantive prevailing party test discussed in Part V, below.
In all of the cases discussed in this section, moreover, the determination of the constitutional claim is completely irrelevant to the
actual situation of the parties, except, of course, that it serves as a
predicate for the award of attorneys' fees. As explained below, adoption of the prevailing party test would focus a court on the actual
relief obtained by the prevailing plaintiff, while obviating the need
for otherwise unnecessary constitutional determinations.
b.

What's Wrong with Morales?

Perhaps the rulings discussed above are not so objectionable. It
could be argued, for example, that these Morales-type determinations are well within the legislative scheme. It could be urged that
their consequences are not so dire and, in any case, that they are
preferable to the alternative; i.e., mechanical application of Hagans/
Gibbs. Neither argument is persuasive.
The first contention recognizes that the restraints imposed on
the court by the State Claims Tests are essentially precatory as applied to constitutional issues. As discussed above, the award of attorney's fees is to be determined under Hagans/Gibbs if the court is
"reluctant" to decide the constitutional question. Where the court is
not "reluctant" to decide the constitutional claim, as in Slawik, Searsport and the "future cases" referred to in County Executive, the
State Claims Tests do not require it to refrain from doing so. Under
this interpretation, however, the State Claims Tests would encourage
state courts to address constitutional questions solely to determine
whether attorneys' fees are to be awarded. This is inconsistent with
the implicit congressional intent to further the application of the
avoidance doctrine, which is generally accepted in the federal
courts."2
In response to the second contention, focusing on the consequences of these rulings, the arguments against these Morales-like
decisions are even stronger than those underlying the original adoption of the avoidance doctrine. The avoidance doctrine deters courts
from considering otherwise justiciable constitutional questions where
the underlying dispute may be resolved without doing so."' 3 In the
132. But see M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 6, at 14-20 (noting that several state
courts do not adhere to the avoidance doctrine).
133. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
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context of deciding whether fees may be awarded where a plaintiff
has prevailed on a state non-fee claim, on the other hand, the underlying dispute has already been decided. There is no longer a live
constitutional issue. These retroactive determinations may establish
constitutional precedent binding on future litigants, at least in that
particular jurisdiction, where in fact no constitutional right is at
stake. This is contrary to our jurisprudence"" in part because it creates a serious risk of ill-considered law. The Searsport court, for
example, unnecessarily reaches the rather complex question of defining property rights for purposes of the due process clause, engaging
in a convoluted analysis completely irrelevant to the rights and obligations of the parties before it. While Morales-type determinations
may be preferable in some cases to a mechanical application of Hagans/Gibbs, neither approach is satisfactory, especially where there
13 5
is a simpler alternative.
It could further be argued that considerations of judicial economy militate against Morales-type rulings. The judicial economy argument may not seem very compelling where, as in Slawik and Searsport, the court holds that the constitutional claim can be decided
without a remand for a plenary hearing. The dubious justification
for committing scarce judicial resources to such a remand, solely to
decide whether to award attorneys' fees, is inevitably a factor in the
court's decision that a remand is unnecessary. This may be prejudicial to the plaintiff since the court is well aware that the only consequence of an adverse ruling (at least in the case at bar) is a denial of
attorneys' fees. A post-judgment constitutional adjudication may also
disadvantage the plaintiff where it becomes clear relatively early in
the proceedings that the court will decide the matter on state
grounds. Under these circumstances, plaintiff would probably not focus on proving her federal constitutional claim unless defendant
moved for its dismissal. Such a motion would give plaintiff both notice of the grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to rebut. In
contrast, where the court addresses the issue in the context of a postjudgment fee application, as a practical matter the plaintiff is less
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); but cf. Client's Council v. Pierce, 778
F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1985) (granting fees where plaintiff prevailed on constitutional claim rather
than "identical" statutory-fee claim). See generally Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the U.S. Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 MICH. L. REV. 261

(1951).
134. U.S. v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory
Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002 (1924); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the 'Case or Controversyv' Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
135. See infra Part V.
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likely to have either notice or an opportunity to rebut since fees
rather than the merits are at stake. 3 6
Nor are these Morales-type determinations necessary to protect
defendants. There are other safeguards to ensure that defendants are
not unfairly compelled to pay attorneys' fees. Defendants have the
option of seeking dismissal of a frivolous fee claim at any phase of
the litigation. If a defendant does not choose to do so, she should not
have a second chance following what would become merely a prelim1 87 Defendants can alinary determination in the plaintiff's favor.
ways appeal a fee award to the United States Supreme Court, moreover, because entitlement under the civil rights fee-shifting statute
raises a question of federal law." 8
Finally, the superfluous determinations required by Morales
should be abjured because it is unclear how they should be made. It
is obviously unfair to restrict the plaintiff to a record developed for
another purpose. Yet a full evidentiary hearing represents a stupendous squandering of resources, even if the defendant is ultimately
held responsible for the resulting fees. In many cases, moreover, such
a hearing would be unproductive because of the prolonged period of
time between the commencement of the case and the fee
determination.' 9
As explained elsewhere,"'4 there are good reasons for the uneasiness which has led state courts to adopt a Morales approach to constitutional questions for fee purposes. Morales is not the answer,
however, because it contravenes well-established principles of justiciability, because in doing so it may distort the developing law, and,
above all, because it is so blatantly inefficient.
136. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
137. Indeed, a rule mandating adjudication of non-constitutional claims (or, in certain
states, even an undecided constitutional claim) may have an adverse impact on defendants, who
may well be held liable for the additional costs if they lose. While defendants would have the
* option of avoiding that additional increment by defaulting, as a practical matter default may
not be an option, particularly for the elected officials who are frequently defendants in such
cases. Declining to affirmatively appeal, on the other hand, may be more feasible. See generally P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (providing for Supreme Court review of state court
cases involving rights under federal statutes); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590
(1874). But see infra note 295.
139. In Urban League v. Mayor and Council of Carteret, 115 N.J. 536, 559 A.2d 1369
(1989), for example, the federal fee claim would have had to be determined on a fragmentary
13-year old record.
140. See text accompanying notes 90-106 (discussing difficulty and dubious utility of
distinguishing between statutory and constitutional claims in the fee context). See also text
accompanying notes 163-69 (noting lack of a nexus between relief obtained and fee award
under Hagans/ Gibbs).
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4. Hagans/Gibbs
In addition to the Morales-like determinations discussed above,
HaganslGibbs has been increasingly relied on by state courts hesitant to render otherwise unnecessary determinations of fee claims.
This demonstrates the state courts' acceptance of the basic premise of
Hagans/Gibbs,i.e., that a result achieved under state law can be a
legitimate basis for an award of attorneys' fees. The Hagans/ Gibbs
test itself, however, remains problematic, as shown by its operation
in the cases considered below.
a. Parallel State and Federal Claims
Hagans/Gibbs is frequently relied on where a plaintiff's claims
under state law track her claims under federal law, and are based on
essentially the same facts. A federal due process claim may be coupled with a due process claim under the state constitution, for instance. In such cases, following a recitation of the parallels between
the state non-fee claim and the federal fee claim, the courts formalisticly invoke Hagans/Gibbsand grant fees. The implication is that a
plaintiff prevailing on her state claim could as easily have prevailed
on her federal claim. In Davis v. Everett, 4 for example, the plaintiff had been denied an application for a liquor license on the ground
that her premises were less than 600 feet from a church, measured in
a straight line, while other businesses had been granted such licenses
where they were within 600 feet measured by a straight line but
greater than the specified distance when measured by the "public
access" method. The plaintiff claimed that the City violated her due
process and equal protection rights under the state and federal constitutions by applying the ordinance in a discriminatory manner. 4 2
The Alabama Supreme Court found that "[a]ll of [plaintiff's] claims
arose from the same underlying facts, i.e., the commissioners' denial
of plaintiff's application for the license."' 4 In granting fees, the
court tersely applied the Hagans/Gibbs test, noting the similarity
between the plaintiff's state and federal constitutional claims:
Defendants violated plaintiff's equal protection rights under the
Alabama Constitution. It may also follow that plaintiffs federal
constitutional rights were violated; she alleged a substantial fed141. 443 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. 1983).
142. Id. at 1234.
143. Id. at 1236. While the court's characterization of the facts as the "same" rather
than "common" suggests evidentiary identity, the broad, occurrence-based description of those
facts is more consistent with a transactional approach.
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eral claim, which was not dismissed, and ultimately prevailed
on her state constitutional claim. The Gibbs test was satisfied
because both claims arose from a common nucleus of operative
facts."'
In Cepulonis v. Registrars of Voters,'4 the Massachusetts
court similarly granted fees in a perfunctory opinion after noting the
parallels between the state and federal claims. The Cepulonis court
struck the statutory restrictions under which the inmate plaintiffs
were not permitted to register to vote as violative of the state constitution. While the plaintiffs had not proven all the elements of a federal claim, the court observed that under the federal constitution a
state could not arbitrarily discriminate among inmates without violating analogous federal equal protection guarantees.' 6
As the Cepulonis court recognized, a plaintiff prevailing on a
state claim would not necessarily prevail on a parallel federal claim.
Federal law may mandate a different result than state law; the standard of proof, the procedural prerequisites, and the conceptual approach may all be different.' 47 Indeed, the plaintiff probably brought
parallel state and federal claims in response to such differences. Yet,
state courts freely grant fees in such cases.
The most compelling explanation for fee awards under these
circumstances is that the relief sought under the two legally related
claims is likely to overlap.' 48 By obtaining the relief sought under
their state claims, the plaintiffs in Davis and Cepulonis basically
achieved the same relief that they sought under their federal civil
rights claims. Since the defendants failed to have the federal claims
dismissed, and the result might have been the same had the plaintiffs
prevailed on those claims, it is presumed that the plaintiffs have vindicated rights cognizable under federal, as well as state, authority.
They have a legitimate right to an award of attorneys' fees because
they have furthered Congress' goal in enacting the federal civil rights
144. Id. at 1236.
145. 396 Mass. 808, 488 N.E.2d 1166 (1986).
146. Although it is not clear what plaintiffs had to prove to meet the state constitutional
standard, the opinion suggests that the additional proofs required for the federal claim would
have involved a rebuttal of any facts showing that the "statutory classification . . .fulfil[led]
some compelling state interest or even ha[d] a rational relation to a legitimate end." Id. at 810,
488 N.E.2d at 1168.
147. As the Cepulonis court noted, for example, under the federal constitution a state
may deny all convicted felons the right to register (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24
(1974)). Id. at 809, 488 N.E.2d at 1167.
148. A secondary justification may be that there is little question in such cases of a
frivolous fee claim that a more diligent adversary would have moved to dismiss.
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statute. The state courts discussed in this section have implicitly recognized that the juridical means by which plaintiffs further the underlying purpose of the federal civil rights statutes should not affect
their entitlement to fees. This is reflected in the ubiquitous references to the court's "choice of an alternative route.""" It is the result
achieved, and not the coincidental, mechanical satisfaction of Hagans /Gibbs, that justifies the fee award.
b. Reliance on the Hensley Test
Probably the most significant trend in state courts is the application of Hagans/Gibbsin conjunction with the prevailing party test
5 A fee
formulated by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart."'
award predicated on both tests not only satisfies the technical criteria
of Hagans/Gibbs,but is legitimated by the substantive rationale of
Hensley.
In Hensley, the plaintiffs sued on behalf of all persons involuntarily held in the forensic unit of a state hospital. The District Court
found violations under the U.S. Constitution in five of the six general areas of treatment received by the inmate patients. The court
awarded fees under the Fees Act, and rejected the defendant's argument that there should be no award for that portion of the attorney's
time spent on unsuccessful claims. The Supreme Court held that:
Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has
won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced
simply because the district court did not adopt each contention
raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the
district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. 5'
As some state courts have recognized, Hensley provides crucial clarification as to the relationships among relief, claims and fees. Although Hensley distinguished between unsuccessful and successful
fee claims, the principle enunciated; i.e., that the award of fees depends on results; is equally applicable where state non-fee claims
and federal fee claims are involved. In Hensley, the Supreme Court
for the first time addresses the kinds of claims for which fees may
properly be awarded. Although it does so in the context of determin149. Bung's Bar & Grille, 206 N.J. Super. 432, 502 A.2d 1198 (1985).
150. 461 U.S. 424 (1983). See generally Dobbs, Reducing Attorneys' Fees for Partial
Success: A Coninent on Hensley and Blum, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 835 (arguing that Hensley
fails to provide a standard by which "success" is to be determined).
151. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
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ing the amount of fees, it is clear that the analysis is equally applicable for ascertaining whether the award of fees may properly be predicted on a particular claim, including a state non-fee claim. 5 '
This principle was firmly grasped by the Massachusetts court
in Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare. 5 The plaintiff had
asked the welfare department to help him purchase a washing machine. He was refused because department regulations only permitted assistance to families whose washing machines were beyond repair, not to those making initial purchases. The plaintiff challenged
the regulation on equal protection and federal statutory grounds, 54
and under the Massachusetts State Administrative Procedure Act.
The court awarded the plaintiff a vendor payment enabling him to
purchase a washing machine and granted his application for fees
under the Fees Act. On appeal, the Massachusetts court upheld the
fee award, citing Hagans/Gibbs. While recognizing that Hagans/
Gibbs may have been sufficient on its face under existing law, the
court tacitly acknowledged its dissatisfaction with the test, which it
characterized as "a compromise."' 5 The court went beyond the
technical application of Hagans/Gibbs, correctly incorporating the
Hensley analysis:
The fee incentive is equally useful and necessary whether the
right in question is secured by Federal law alone, or by State
law as well. Therefore, the fact that a plaintiff claiming relief
under § 1983 could have obtained relief solely by means of a
a "routine" one-does not foreclose a fee
State remedy-even
6
award.'

5

The Massachusetts court focused on the relief obtained by the
parties, stressing that the legal route through which it was achieved
was irrelevant. Where relief contemplated by the civil rights statutes
is obtained, it is only where that relief cannot be attributed to a fee
claim-as it could not be attributed to the unsuccessful claims in
Hensley-that fees must be denied in connection with such a claim.
As applied in conjunction with Hensley, Hagans/Gibbs simply shifts
152. See id. at 449 n.8 (discussing various tests utilized by the Courts of Appeals, and
citing with approval the First Circuit's Nadeau formulation).
153. .387 Mass. 312, 439 N.E.2d 778 (1982).
154. Plaintiff cited a federal regulation under the Social Security Act, 45 C.F.R. §
233.10 (a)(1) (1981), which provided in pertinent part that state assistance programs "must
not result in inequitable treatment ...." Id. at 315, 439 N.E.2d at 781.
155. "The [HaganslGibbsl rule is a compromise between accurate application of §
1983 and § 1988, and traditional policy of refraining from unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions." Id. at 317, 439 N.E.2d at 783.
156. Id. at 317, 439 N.E.2d at 783 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the burden of proof, effectively creating a presumption in favor of
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff obtains some of the relief sought under
her federal fee claim by prevailing on her state non-fee claim, and
the defendant has failed to have the plaintiff's federal fee claim dismissed, a fee award can properly be predicated on that claim without
any further determination under Hagans/Gibbs.
The California courts have also applied Hensley in the context
of fees based on state claims. In FilipinoAccountants v. State Board
of Accountancy, 5 ' petitioner Filipino Accountants Association
claimed that the California State Board of Accountancy (the
"Board") had consistently refused to grant waivers permitting accountants certified in the Philippines to practice in California without taking the qualifying examination, although it typically granted
such waivers to accountants certified in Commonwealth countries
whose licensing standards were lower than those of the Philippines.
Petitioners claimed that in doing so the Board violated the applicable
California statutes as well as the due process and equal protection
rights of its members under the federal and state constitutions. The
trial court issued a Notice of Intended Decision, in which it found
that the Board had abused its discretion under the cited provisions of
the California Business and Professions Code. The parties subsequently entered into a stipulation of judgment, following which the
court granted the petitioners' request for attorneys' fees under the
Fees Act. Although the court cited Hagans/Gibbs in granting fees, it
relied in equal measure on the Hensley test, noting that
"[aipparently the [Supreme] Court was unanimous on [the following] point:'""'
A plaintiff must be a 'prevailing party' to recover an attorney's
fee under [the Fees Act]. The standard for making this threshold determination has been framed in various ways. A typical
formulation is that 'plaintiffs may be considered prevailingparties for attorney's fees purposes ifthey succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit.""
The Hensley court explicitly addressed the dilemma which is at
the core of the State Claims Tests; i.e., that those tests fail to provide
the court with a rationale for determining whether to award fees:
157. 155 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 204 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1984).
158. Id. at 1031 n.6, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 917 n.6.
159. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st
Cir. 1978)) (emphasis added).
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The legislative history, therefore, does not provide a definitive
answer as to the proper standardfor setting a fee award where
the plaintiff has achieved only limited success. Consistent with
the legislative history, Courts of Appeals generally have recognized the relevance of the results obtained to the amount of a fee
award. They have adopted varying standards, however, for applying this principle in cases where the plaintiff did not succeed
on all claims asserted. 16
Hensley, by adopting the Nadeau standard of "[success] on any
significant issue . . .which achieves some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit," provides the theory manque. It could not
have been put more plainly: "The result is what matters. '"161 The
Hensley formulation not only clarifies the State Claims Tests, it renders them superfluous.
C.

The State Claims Tests Have Outlived Their Usefulness

The State Claims Tests had two basic purposes. First, they
were intended to make it absolutely clear that fees would be available for civil rights claimants who obtained some of the relief sought
on federal fee claim grounds by prevailing on state law grounds. Second, they were supposed to provide a procedural framework for such
fee awards. Their success with respect to the first point is irrefutable.
The notion that state claimants may be granted fees is firmly entrenched at the state as well as the federal level. As shown in the
state cases discussed above, on the other hand, the State Claims Tests
have been a failure as a procedural guide in state court.
The State Claims Tests are like the first stage of a rocket which
holds the fuel essential for blast off, enabling the missile to overcome
gravity and reach its proper orbit. Once that is accomplished, it
serves no further purpose and is jettisoned. The State Claims Tests
have already served their purpose. Their continued presence, far
from guiding the state courts in awarding fees, only causes them to
wobble. By occupying the court with technical requirements that
have "scant support in logic," the State Claims Tests become a distraction from the proper focus of the fee inquiry as clarified in Hensley; i.e., the civil rights-related relief actually obtained. The State
Claims Tests should be abandoned because their first purpose has
been achieved and, at least in state courts, their application impedes
rather than facilitates the emergence of a clear standard for fee
160.
,-1

Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added).
Id. at 435.

19901

CIVIL RIGHTS FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES

539

awards.
The previous section considered some of the difficulties state
courts have had in applying the State Claims Tests. Before considering the consequences of rejecting these tests, it might be useful to
briefly dissect their failure, if only to highlight some of the pitfalls
awaiting those who seek to apply federal tests in state courts. Since
Morales has not been relied upon by a state court since the enactment of the Fees Act, its de facto abandonment may be assumed,
especially in view of the strong arguments against its revival.' 62 Unlike Morales, the Hagans/Gibbs prong of the State Claims Tests is
frequently, if ambivalently, relied upon and accordingly merits a
more exacting analysis. Why does it not work?
Hagans/Gibbs was originally devised to determine whether a
federal court could properly assert jurisdiction over a pendent state
claim.' 6 ' The test addresses the power of a federal court. When it is
used in the context of fee awards in state court, however, the question is not whether the state court has the power to adjudicate the
claim, but whether Congress has the authority to require it to consider a fee award. 6 " Whether Congress may decide that certain
claimants in state courts can be granted attorneys' fees depends on
whether the grant of such fees is "necessary and proper" to further a
legitimate congressional purpose under McCulloch v. Maryland.6"
There is no question that the protection and enforcement of civil
rights is a legitimate federal goal within the meaning of McCulloch.' 66 Denial of civil rights remains pervasive. 6 ' Local experimentation by the states may generate promising new approaches to this
problem.' 68 Encouraging such experimentation by assuring state
162. See supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
164. The distinction blurs in federal court because of Congress' authority with respect to
the jurisdiction of article III courts. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
165. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
166. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of Congress' power under
the commerce clause).
167. See Verbatim: A Widening Gap, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1988, § 4, at 4, col. 1:
America is moving backward not forward in its effort to achieve the full participation of minority citizens in the life and prosperity of the nation. In education,
employment, income, health, longevity and other basic measures of individual
and social well-being, gaps persist-and in some cases are widening-between
members of minot'ity groups and the majority population.
See also One Third of a Nation, Commission on Minority Participation in Education and
American Life, report released the week of May 22, 1988. The Commission is a 37 member
panel, including former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald R. Ford.
168. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301-27D-329 (West
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claimants the same availability of attorneys' fees as they would have
in federal court certainly furthers a legitimate congressional purpose.
But the Hagans/Gibbstest does not do so because a state claim may
satisfy that test without furthering Congress' goals in promoting the
enforcement of civil rights. We can draw a simple diagram:

claims
State
together
asserted

!

State claims

with a federal

that further

claim
that meet
Hagansl/Gibbs

civil rights

Instead of assuring attorneys' fees for those who vindicate civil
rights, Hagans/Gibbs arbitrarily showers fees on those who satisfy a
two-prong test unrelated to those rights. Only in the shaded area
where the circles overlap do fee awards granted under Hagans/
Gibbs actually advance civil rights. Pennies from heaven, falling only
on some civil rights claimants as well as on those whose suits do not
in any sense promote civil rights, further no congressional goal.
1. The Hagans prong
The Hagans requirement that the federal fee claim be "substantial" appears to bear a direct relation to Congress' goal in enacting the fee-shifting civil rights statutes. Accordingly, it would pass
constitutional muster. 169 Indeed, it could be argued that the cases in
which fees have been granted in the absence of such a "substantial"
1985). Under this Act, each municipality in New Jersey is required to provide a specified
number of housing units affordable to lower income households. See generally, supra notes 6567; Payne, Title VIII and Mount Laurel: Is Affordable Housing Fair Housing?, 6 YALF L.
& POL'Y REV. 361 (1988). See also, Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement
of Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20 (1987).
169. This does not detract, of course, from a possible coextensive obligation on the part
of the states. See generally Hallee, Within the States' Jurisdiction: Metropolitan, Northeast,
Bankcorp, and the Equal Protection Clause, 96 YALE L.J. 2110 (1987) (analyzing the jurisdictional scope of the states' obligation to provide equal protection).
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federal fee claim invite challenge on due process170 as well as "necessary and proper" grounds.
Defendant may move to dismiss the plaintiff's federal claim at
any time during the proceeding if it is "insubstantial." The use of
this test for fee purposes, however, shifts the burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to come forward and show that her federal claim is
not "insubstantial." More importantly, it requires her to do so after
the matter has been decided. In effect, the plaintiff is thereby required to retroactively prove the substantiality of her federal claim,
1 71
on a record developed for another purpose.
There may be cases where a plaintiff focuses on her state claim
because it is simpler to prove than her federal fee claim. It may be
extremely time consuming and expensive, for example, to prove that
state prison officials are failing to set bail promptly as required by
Gerstein v. Pugh1 2 because no records are kept from which to ascertain the appropriate fact-based standard to which the officials should
be held.1 73 Proceedings under a state statute requiring the establishment of bail schedules may result in the same relief sought under the
still unproven federal claim.174 It may well be impossible for a plaintiff to show that her federal fee claim was "substantial" at this phase
of the proceedings, since a court is unlikely to permit the exhaustive
discovery necessary for her to do so where the underlying substantive
dispute has already been resolved. Under Hagans/Gibbs, there
would be no fee award even though the goal of the fee-shifting civil
rights statutes may have been appreciably advanced. This is inconsistent with those cases which have focused, correctly in the author's
75
view, on the relief obtained.1
170. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require some form
of notice before property rights may be impaired. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 507-13 (1st ed. 1978).
171. Cf supra text accompanying notes 131-39 (discussing arguments against postjudgment adjudications of constitutional questions solely to determine fee entitlement under
Morales).
172. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
173. Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1987).
174. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
175. As Wolf points out, doubts as to the validity of Gibbs as a jurisdictional test are
equally pertinent in this context. See infra note 189. A related question is whether utilization
of Gibbs here interferes with the states' authority over their courts in violation of the tenth
amendment. It may seem less problematic since Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) affirmed that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce
power is that inherent in all congressional action the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal government action." Id. at 556. But this is a volatile area of the law. "After changing course four times ... within a period of nine years, the
[Garcia] Court has initiated a search for a more durable theory of tenth amendment limita-
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The Gibbs prong

2.

Where the Gibbs "common nucleus" formulation is liberally
construed, it will eliminate very few state claims. Where it is narrowly read, it will foreclose many. But the Gibbs test is troublesome176 in this context because in neither case, nor in any along the
continuum thereby defined, will the qualifying state claims necessarily further civil rights. Gibbs permits fees in cases where no such
goals are furthered, and precludes fees in other cases where they are.
a.

Doctrinal origins of Gibbs

Gibbs is probably not the last in a line of cases concerned with
the constitutional scheme which establishes the federal courts as
courts of limited jurisdiction.17 7 The question of the proper limits of
that jurisdiction, and whether it extends to nonfederal claims, was
first addressed in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.17 8 In that
case, Chief Justice Marshall articulated the principle that the Supreme Court could not properly function unless it could assert jurisdiction over all questions, including nonfederal ones, presented by a
particular case.1' 9 This has been characterized as a "rule of necessity" since a contrary holding would have effectively closed the federal courts to cases requiring resolution of state as well as federal
issues."*° In Osborn, federal jurisdiction was predicated on the
bank's federal charter, addressed by the Court as a threshold
matter. ' 1
tions on federal power." Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1665-66 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
176. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Harrington v.
DeVito, 656 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993 (1982); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549
(5th Cir. 1982); Johnston v. Jago, 691 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1982); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411
(3d Cir. 1979).
177. See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 22-26 (4th ed. 1983);
THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton); U.S. CONST. art. III; Note, The Evolution and
Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1018 (1962).
178. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
179. As noted in 13 B. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3567 (1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE], this "functional justification of
the Osborn rule" is consistent with the language of article III, which grants jurisdiction over
"cases" instead of questions.
180. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 179, at § 3567 n.4 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 554 (1974)).
181. But see C. WRIGHT, supra note 177, at 91 (noting that the bank's status under its
federal charter could have enabled the Court to find a federal element in any claims involving
the bank).
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The question in Osborn was not whether Congress' presumably
legitimate purpose in chartering the bank would be served by a particular decision on the state claim. Rather, the issue was simply
whether it was within the court's power to render a decision at all.
The Osborn Court was struggling to accommodate concerns of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants"'182 with the limitations on federal jurisdiction imposed by the Constitution. Osborn
addressed the authority, not of Congress, but of the courts. 83
In Hurn v. Oursler1 84 the Court sought to clarify the question
of pendent jurisdiction by focusing on the "relatedness" of the federal and state legal claims. Hurn was a suit to enjoin the production
of a play on grounds of copyright infringement and unfair competition, the second ground referring to an uncopyrighted version of the
same play. The Court held that the second ground constituted "[a]
separate and distinct" cause of action "entirely outside the federal
jurisdiction."' 85 Thus, Hurn required a determination as to the parameters of the cause of action in each case. The confusion generated
by this test, as well as its "unnecessarily grudging"' 86 application by
the lower courts, led to its rejection in Gibbs.
The Gibbs court clarified the issue by bifurcating the analysis,
addressing first the question of the power of the federal courts to
assert jurisdiction over a pendent state claim, and second, as a matter
of discretion, the circumstances under which that power should be
exercised.
Paul Gibbs was a mine superintendent who also had an arrangement with his coal company employer to haul coal. He was
hired to attempt to open a new mine but was prevented from doing
so by the United Mine Workers union. After one incident of violence, the union maintained a peaceful picket line for nine months.
Gibbs lost his job as well as other trucking contracts he held in the
182. United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
183. The distinction here is not affected by Congress' role in determining the balance of
authority as between state and federal courts. Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 501. As then
Professor Felix Frankfurter observed, referring to the Judiciary Acts and the
perplexing problem of the relation of the United States courts to the states ...
[hiere is a conflict full of political explosives, because entangled in the complex
formulation of the compromises
of relations between states and nation . . . Itihe
demand legal skill, and of a high order. But the bases of adjustment must be
evolved by statesmen, and ought both to enlist and to satisfy public
understanding.
Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 500-01.
184. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
185. Id. at 248.
186. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at725.
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area. He filed suit against the union claiming that he lost his job
because of secondary boycotts by the union, in violation of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947.187 In addition, he asserted interference with contract under state common law.
The Supreme Court held that the district court had not abused
its discretion in proceeding to judgment on the state claim under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. The Court went on to define a standard that vastly expanded the capacity of the federal courts to entertain state claims:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their
federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 88
Gibbs is generally acknowledged to have effected a significant
enlargement of federal pendent jurisdiction.18 9 Expansion of the judicial power to adjudicate claims under state law does not affect Congress' power to regulate such claims in state court. While both forms
of expansion may intrude upon the states, the potential threat to the
states comes from different branches of government. By adopting the
Gibbs test for attorney fee awards in state court, Congress has provided the states with superfluous protection from the threat of a potentially overreaching federal judiciary. There is no such threat, of
course, when the matter is already before a state court. At the same
time, utilization of Gibbs in this context leaves the states fully exposed to interference from another branch of government; i.e., Congress itself. 9
b.

The Gibbs Continuum-Examples and Consequences

The "common nucleus of operative facts" test has been subject
187. 29 U.S.C.A. § 187 (West 1988).
188. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis in original).
189. Indeed, some commentators have argued that it has resulted in an undesirable expansion of that jurisdiction. See Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262, 266 (1967-68) (predicting that Gibbs would result in federal
courts deciding more questions of state law which the state courts are "better equipped" to
decide). As Wolf has noted, those who find Gibbs constitutionally overexpansive may find the
Fees Act beyond Congress' power. Wolf, supra note 42, at 200 n.41.
190. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1591 (1977) (discussing political branches as judges of
the scope of their own constitutional power); see generally Rapaczynski, supra note 6.
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to varied readings. Courts and commentators have disagreed as to the
underlying rationale for the test 9 1 as well as the way in which it
should be applied to a particular set of facts. Some courts have held
that it required evidentiary identity, others differing degrees of evidentiary overlap. 9"
The Gibbs test, as interpreted by the courts, describes a continuum rather than a point. Construed restrictively, Gibbs requires evidentiary identity or substantial overlap' 93 between the state and federal claims. Given a broader reading, it requires merely a "loose
factual connection"' 94 between the federal and state claims. Gibbs,
which was developed to expand the availability of federal forums,' 95
does not correspondingly expand the availability of fees under the
civil rights fee-shifting statutes.' 96 Indeed, the broader the construction given Gibbs, the more attenuated the nexus between the state
and federal claims, and the less likely it is that a claimant prevailing
on the state claim is furthering the goals of the applicable federal
statute.
i.

Narrow construction

Where the facts necessary to support the federal and state
claims are identical, which would be the narrowest reading of Gibbs,
courts have had no difficulty granting fees. Such claims are perforce
legally related.' 9 7 The relief sought under the two legally related
claims is likely to overlap. By obtaining the relief sought under her
state claim, the plaintiff probably achieved at least some of the relief
sought under her federal civil rights claim, thus furthering the goal
of the federal statute.
191. Cf Shakman, supra note 189 and Schenkier, supra note 54 (arguing that Gibbs is
intended to assure a meaningful choice of forum).
192. Schenkier, supra note 54, at 262. See, e.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 518
F. Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1981) (noting appropriateness of pendent jurisdiction where there is an
overlap of evidence necessary to prove state and federal claims).
193. See, e.g., Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987).
194. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 179, at 117 n.9 (section 3567.1).
195. See generally Schenkier, supra note 54, at 247-48 (arguing for the adoption of a
stronger rationale than the generally accepted "judicial economy and convenience" for pendent
jurisdiction and suggesting the provision of a "true choice between state and federal forums for
the adjudication of [plaintiff's] federal claims").
196. Cf Schenkier, supra note 54, at 305 (arguing that differences between state and
federal remedies should not affect the existence or exercise of pendent jurisdiction).
197.

See supra text accompanying notes 134-41.
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ii. Broad construction
The majority of states give Gibbs a liberal reading as a purely
transactional test. This expands the availability of fee awards to a
large class of cases. Absent a requirement that some of the relief
obtained by means of the state claim could have been predicated on
the federal claim, there is no basis for finding that Congress' purpose
will be served by such awards.' 98 This is precisely the nexus demanded by Hensley.'99
This lack of a clear relationship between the state non-fee claim
on which the plaintiff prevails and the federal fee claim has plainly
troubled the state courts. They have strained to establish the requisite relationship by focusing, where possible, on parallel state and
federal claims; by applying Hensley or simply by deciding the federal
fee claim.
Although Hagans/Gibbs has not yet been challenged on the
ground that it promotes no federal purpose, in view of the increase
in state court litigation involving the civil rights fee-shifting statutes
it may only be a matter of time.2"' As discussed in the next part, the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson2"' (emphasizing the
198. Civil rights may be vindicated where the plaintiff prevails on her state claim even
though the relief could not have been awarded under the federal claim. Whether plaintiffs may
be entitled to fees under such circumstances is an open question. See infra notes 278-85 and
accompanying text.
199. Thus, Hensley arguably saves Hagans/Gibbs from unconstitutionality. A case may
include a "substantial" federal fee claim which arises from a "common nucleus of operative
fact" as the state claim upon which plaintiff prevails without in any sense furthering civil
rights. Consider the following hypothetical: A black family applies for an apartment in federally subsidized housing. The landlord accepts their security deposit but rents the apartment to
a white couple. The black family claims that they are being discriminated against under the
federal Fair Housing Act and section 1983. In addition, they sue under state law for punitive
damages in connection with the retention of their security deposit, relief which would not be
available under the federal law. Learning through discovery that the other occupants of the
apartment house are predominantly black, plaintiffs' counsel focuses on the state law claim.
The family wins on that claim and there is no decision on section 1983, the federal constitutional claim. The fee claim, while ultimately without merit, was certainly substantial when
brought within the meaning of Hagans and it arose out of "a common nucleus of operative
fact" as the state claim. Yet plaintiffs, who have prevailed on their state claim, have not vindicated any civil right. Unless the relief obtained under state law is related to relief available
under the federal statute, there is no nexus justifying a fee award. This is the relationship
required by Hensley, under which plaintiffs in this hypothetical would be denied fees.
200. See Leubsdorf, supra note 21, at 35 (predicting repercussions of "fee award revolution" in state courts). State courts, where the unconstitutionality of Hagans/Gibbs is plainest,
are generally less inclined to base their decisions on general constitutional principles which are
not clearly established law. Neuborne, supra note 14, at 1125.
201. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). Although the Smith plaintiffs prevailed on a non-fee federal
rather than a non-fee state claim, under prior cases this should not have made any difference.
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requirement that the fee claim be "related" to the claim on which
plaintiff actually prevailed before fees may be granted) suggests that
the Court might be responsive to such an argument.20 2
V.

THE PREVAILING PARTY TEST-TOWARD AN EXPANDED
THEORY OF ENTITLEMENT

The State Claims Tests should be eliminated. In their place,
state plaintiffs would be required to satisfy the "prevailing party"
test first articulated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 03
Thus, fees could be granted where the party seeking fees "prevailed"
as long as there was no express adverse ruling with respect to her
federal fee claim. That is the law now for all plaintiffs except those
governed by the State Claims Tests; i.e., those claimants who obtain
some of the relief sought in their federal fee claims by means of a
favorable determination on their state claim.
Except for the brief, unexplained segment in which the State
Claims Tests are set forth, the legislative history supports the interpretation urged here. This interpretation is equally consistent with
the major pertinent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court rendered
since the passage of the Fees Act. Indeed, except for the footnote in
the House Report, there is little legal basis, and less policy justification, for the restricted construction of the fee-shifting statutes presently followed in state courts.
A. The Prevailing Party Test in the State Claim/State Court
Context
This section sketches the development of the prevailing party
test, from the early, expansive constructions to the narrower interpretations by the Rehnquist Court. While the early decisions described a broad area in which fee awards could be granted, the
Rehnquist Court is rigorously circumscribing the boundaries of that
territory. The point here is that state claimants who "prevail" under
state law fall well within even the narrow parameters set by the
Rehnquist Court, especially in view of the Court's recent decision in
Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School
202. Congress overruled Smith by enacting the Handicapped Children's Protection Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). This does not detract from my argument
which addresses the Court's interpretation of fee-shifting statutes absent explicit directives
from the legislature, rather than Congress' actual intent.
203. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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2 0 4 All civil rights claimants-including those raising state
District.
law claims-should be held to no more and no less than the "result"
focused test painstakingly enunciated in this series of cases. By imposing additional unrelated requirements on certain state court
plaintiffs, the State Claims Tests detract from and impede this judicially sanctioned approach. An important caveat here is that fee
awards be limited to those cases in which a federal fee claim has
actually been raised.20 5

1. In Light of an Expansive Interpretation of the Fees Act
The Civil Rights Act of 1964206 provides that the "prevailing
party" is entitled to a "reasonable attorney's fee" in the court's discretion. 7 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,"'8 the Supreme Court clarified the standard. In Newman, class action plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of the Act to enjoin racial discrimination
at five drive-in restaurants and a sandwich shop owned by respondents in South Carolina. The district court incorrectly held that Title
II was not applicable to drive-in restaurants. The court of appeals,
reversing the district court's refusal to enjoin the discrimination, instructed the lower court on remand to award attorneys' fees to the
204. 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
205. Where no such claim has been raised, there may be a due process problem where
defendants are held liable for fees without notice. At least four states have permitted awards
under section 1988 "so long as the complaint inferentially stated or made out a claim under
section 1983," M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 6, at 14-19 n.34 (citing Gumbhir v.
Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 231 Kan. 507, 646 P.2d 1078 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1103 (1983); Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 305 N.W.2d 133, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1973
(1981); Harradine v. Board of Supervisors, 73 A.D.2d 118, 425 N.Y.S.2d 182 (4th Dep't
1980); Fairbanks Correctional Center v. Williamson, 600 P.2d 743 (1979)).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
207.
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs
the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) (1982).
208. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The legislative history also noted the usefulness of the private
attorney general model as an alternative to the development of a more extensive enforcement
bureaucracy:
Modern civil rights legislation reflects a heavy reliance on attorneys' fees . ...
Since 1964, every major civil rights law passed by the Congress has included, or
been amended to include, one or more fee provisions . . . .These fee shifting
provisions have been successful in enabling vigorous enforcementof modern civil
rights legislation, while at the same time limiting the growth of the enforcement
bureaucracy.
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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extent that the respondent's defenses had not been advanced in good
faith. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standard under which such awards should be made.
The Court held that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily
recover an attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render
such an award unjust." 2 09 This test, commonly referred to as the
Newman-Northcross standard, 210 has been applied to other civil
rights fee-shifting statutes containing similar language.2"' Unless the
fact that the plaintiff obtained the relief sought in her federal fee
claim by prevailing on a non-fee state claim amounts to "special circumstances"-and there is no legal authority for such a proposition-there is no reason to hold her to a higher standard for fee
awards.
By "prevailing" on her federal fee claim the party has by definition advanced Congress' goal of promoting civil rights and is entitled to compensation under the federal scheme. The prevailing party
test provides a sufficient framework for a fundamentally equitable
determination.2 12 It should be the only test to be met by a party
seeking fees who prevails on a state claim in state court. 1
The term "prevailing" has been read expansively.21 4 Parties
have been held to be prevailing under the Newman-Northcross test
where they succeeded on some but not all of their asserted claims, 5
209. Neuman, 390 U.S. at 402.
210. Note, supra note 2, at 1296 n.22. See Newman, 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
211. See Northcross, 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (holding that statutes containing similar language and sharing common raison d'etre should be interpreted pari passu; prevailing plaintiff
under section 718 of Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1617 held entitled to fees
"unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id. at 428); see generally
E. LARSON, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF ATTORNEYS FEES (Supp. 1986).
212. This does not completely preempt the need for an analysis of the underlying right
in the undecided federal fee claim. See infra text accompanying notes 286-88. But such analysis may be necessary even when the fee award is directly predicated on the federal claim. Cf
Note, supra note 2, at 1297 (noting that some courts have "emphasized that the successful
plaintiff-applicant need not show the defendant proceeded in bad faith or frivolously, that the
nature of his conduct was intentional or wanton, or that the plaintiff himself is unable to pay
the fees."). But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982) (plaintiff must show that she cannot pay fees).
213. Each case may be viewed as an opportunity for the education of state court judges
as to the availability of fees in civil rights actions. See generally Note, State Enforceinent of
Federally Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1551 (1960) (discussing application of federal
law by state court judges).
214. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 214; see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 21,
at 32-33 (noting "signs of a movement to compensate litigants who do not prevail but who
represent a group whose members could otherwise not afford to be heard.")
215. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
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where nominal damages are awarded,21 where remedial action
moots the case prior to adjudication, 2" where a settlement is
reached,21 8 where a consent decree issues,2" 9 where they have obtained relief although not judgment and even where they have
merely acted as "catalysts" 2 ' in obtaining the relief sought.2" 2' As
the court of appeals observed in Bonnes v. Long 2 2 inquiry may turn
to:
whether as a quite practical matter the outcome . ..is one to

which the plaintiff fee claimant's efforts contributed in a significant way, and which does involve an actual conferral of benefit
or relief from burden . .

.

.Further, some courts have stated

that a party need not achieve total success in order to be considered prevailing; others, that the proper focus is whether the
party has been successful on the central issue; and still others
that a plaintiff who has lost his individual claim may be considered to have prevailed if he has succeeded on a class claim. Finally, it appears that even a plaintiff who has prevailed through
a settlement or consent judgment rather than through litigation
may be labeled the prevailing party for attorneys' fees purposes.
Claimants who prevail on state claims should not be held to a
higher standard, even if it may appear to be a minimally higher
standard. 223 A determination that she has prevailed by means of a
state claim is as sufficient as a determination that plaintiff has prevailed through any other means. The crucial question is whether the
relief has been achieved as a result of the litigation.2 24 Whether a
216. Milne v. Cavuto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981).
217. Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993
(1981).
218. Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1979).
219. Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205 (11th Cir. 1983).
220. See Fields v. Tarpon Springs, 721 F.2d 318 (lth Cir. 1983).
221. Note, Attorneys' Fees-How Much Can A PartiallyPrevailing Plaintiff Recover
in Civil Rights Actions?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 473, 476 (1984) (noting that the courts have addressed the issue of when a party should be considered prevailing in several cases and citing
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978): "[Wle conclude that plaintiffs' may be
considered 'prevailing parties' for attorneys' fees purposes if they succeed on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id.).
See also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433
F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (claim of racially discriminatory employment practices). Although
there was no decision on the merits, fees were awarded because the court found that defendant
adopted fair employment practices "in response" to the lawsuit.
222. 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979).
223. As set forth at supra text accompanying notes 34-53, while the drafters may have
intended a minimal test, this has not been the result in state court.
224. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279. It must also be determined whether the relief could have
been attained under the federal fee claim. Id. at 281. Again, this focus on the nature of the
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legitimate federal purpose is furthered is an "ends" rather than a
"means" oriented test.2 25
There is no justification, for example, for imposing a greater
burden on claimants prevailing on state claims than on settling
claimants. The settling plaintiff does not necessarily have a more
meritorious claim. Although the claimant prevailing on the state
claim has not obtained a favorable ruling on her fee claim, the defendant has failed to defeat that claim even though plaintiff had the
burden of proof.
Moreover, by holding plaintiffs who prevail on state claims to a
higher standard, the State Claims Tests indirectly provide a disincentive' for defendants to settle, since litigating gives them a greater
chance of avoiding fees.226 Any additional deterrent to settlement is
particularly burdensome for plaintiffs because of the rule established
by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Jeff D.22 7 The Evans Court held
that defendants could insist on settlement of attorneys' fee claims as
part of the settlement of civil rights cases. Many commentators have
228 rule, under which fees
criticized this rejection of the Prandini
were required to be the subject of separate negotiations.229 As the
commentators and the Prandini court noted, merger of the merits
and fee issues put the self-interest of the civil rights lawyer in direct
conflict with that of her client.23
In most private litigation, there is little need to separate the settlement of claims for attorneys' fees from the merits of the case since
the client will be liable for the fee in any case. In civil rights cases,
as Congress expressly acknowledged in enacting the fee-shifting statutes, the client is typically unable to pay. Thus, the defendant can
condition settlement on the plaintiff's waiver of fees, rendering the
relief is more of an 'ends' than a 'means' oriented inquiry.
225. As Justice Scalia observed in Hewitt: "It is settled law, of course, that relief need
not be judicially decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988. . . . The 'equivalency'
doctrine is simply an acknowledgment of the primacy of the redress over the means by which it
is obtained." 482 U.S. at 760-61.
226. The fees, of course, are likely to be substantially less at the settling stage.
227. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
228. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
229. See, e.g., The Supreme Court Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 258-67
(1986) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (agreeing with Justice Brennan's criticism that the majority misread the purpose of the Fees Act "by assuming that the attorneys' fee award is merely a
remedy like damages and injunctive relief." Id. at 263 & n.34); Comment, Evans t'. Jeff D.
and the Proper Scope of State Ethics Decisions, 73 VA. L. REV. 783 (1987) (examining conflict between Evans and state ethics decisions).
230. The New Jersey Supreme Court is the first state court to address this issue. In
Coleman v. Fiore, 113 N.J. 594, 592 A.2d 141 (1989), it held that bifurcated settlement negotiations were appropriate where a public interest group was the plaintiff.
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attorneys' fee theoretically available to civil rights plaintiffs at the
settlement stage illusory. 8
The State Claims Tests become another hurdle to plaintiffs, requiring additional argument and perhaps proofs which do not directly inure to the client's benefit. This further reduces the defendant's incentive to offer, and the plaintiff's leverage to insist upon, a
fee award as part of settlement. Requiring the plaintiff to satisfy
only the prevailing party test, while far from correcting the inequity
of the Evans rule, simplifies the issue of court-awarded fees if the
plaintiff rejects settlement and prevails on her state non-fee claim.
Similarly, there is no reason for distinguishing between plaintiffs who have acted as a "catalyst" without litigating a matter to
conclusion and those who have served as a catalyst by litigating until
they obtained a ruling on their state non-fee claim. Here, as in the
case where there is no settlement, the additional litigation may simply be attributable to a recalcitrant defendant. Intractable adversaries may well be more common in state court, since the federal rules
deter such behavior. 2 2
Abandoning the State Claims Tests does not give any advantage
to plaintiffs litigating in state court. It would merely assure that they
are not subject to a more difficult standard than their counterparts in
federal court. There is no justification for requiring plaintiffs who
further civil rights through the use of state law to meet a higher
standard than plaintiffs achieving the same result through other
means.

238

231. See Leading Cases, supra note 229, at 260-61 & n.19 (noting that the majority's
argument that a proscription of fee waivers would "reduce the attractiveness of settlement"
ignored respondents' argument that the "lack of any potential liability for fees will provide an
incentive to delaying settlement." Id.).
232. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 68. Some states have enacted similar rules. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-59.1 (West 1989).
233. Nor, after Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Hous. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985), can there be any serious contention that the question of such entitlement must be left
to the states. See Field, Garcia v.Satz Antonio Met. Hous. Trans. Auth.: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985). But cf. Baird, State Empowerment After
Garcia, 18 URB. LAW. 491 (1986) (arguing that Garcia's impact is limited). See generally
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Governnent Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Michelman, States Rights
and States Roles: The Permutations of State 'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities z.
User., 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) (grappling with the implications of National League of
Cities, the case that was overturned in Garcia); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (arguing that "the Constitution's political structure of federalism and
sovereignty is designed to protect .. . individual rights." Amar, supra, at 1426). See also
supra note 170.
This does not mean that the states are foreclosed from enacting fee-shifting legislation of
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In Light of a More Restrictive Construction of the Fees Act

In several recent decisions, the Supreme Court has curtailed the
availability of fees for prevailing civil rights plaintiffs. While these
cases are certainly open to criticism,284 the standards enunciated in
Smith v. Robinson,2" Hewitt v. Helms286 and North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council,
Inc. 237 provide a far more coherent set of guidelines than those established by the State Claims Tests. In Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District,2 " the most recent
pronouncement, the Court, while not reversing its restrictive trend,
at least calls a halt to it.
In Smith the Court elucidates the requisite relationship between
the fee claim and the rest of the litigation. In Crest Street, the Court
limits the kind of "proceedings" which are covered by the Fees Act.
In Hewitt, Justice Scalia stresses the actual relief obtained, rather
than the juridical means of doing so. In Garland, Justice O'Connor
resolves a split in the courts of appeals by holding that the plaintiff
need not prevail on the "central issue" in the litigation in order to be
awarded fees.
As explained below, in these cases the Court considered the core
issues involved in determining whether an award of fees is available
for state claimants who prevail on state grounds. These decisions
supply strong, if indirect, support for the proposition that fees should
be available for state civil rights claimants under the prevailing party
test. The additional proofs currently imposed under the State Claims
Tests are clearly irrelevant to the demanding but carefully delineated
framework established by the Court.
a. North Carolina Department of Transportation v.
Crest Street Community Council, Inc.
In Crest Street,2" 9 the plaintiffs stopped the extension of a fedtheir own. See infra note 282.
234. Perhaps 'the most cogent criticism is to be found in the dissents. See, e.g., Hewitt,
482 U.S. at 764 (5-4 decision; Marshall, J., dissenting); Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 16 (6-3
decision; Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Gans, infra note 239, at 910 (noting that "[riecent
Supreme Court interpretation of Section 1988 has diluted the effectiveness of its fee-shifting
provisions.").
235. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
236. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
237. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
238. 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
239. 479 U.S. 6 (1986). See generally Conroy, Recent Developments, Section 1988
Claimfor Attorneys Fees Limited to Costs of Actual Court Proceedings, 16 STETSON L. REV.
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erally funded expressway through a predominantly black neighborhood by filing an administrative complaint with the U.S. Department of Transportation. They claimed that the proposed action
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."0 Negotiations
resulted in a resolution favorable to the plaintiffs, who then sought
fees under the Fees Act. Their request was eventually granted by the
court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "only a
court in an action to enforce one of the civil rights statutes" could
award fees.
Noting that the "legislative history is replete with references to
the enforcement of civil rights statutes 'in suits', 'through the courts'
and by 'judicial process' "241 the Court emphasized that under the
Fees Act a "judicial complaint" was requisite to an award. The
Court's insistence that fees be strictly confined to litigation242 highlights the importance of fee availability in state court in two ways.
First, the Court made it absolutely clear that the source of the
law upon which relief is predicated is not dispositive as to the availability of fees. Although the Crest Street plaintiffs were proceeding
under administrative regulations promulgated under Title VI, the
Court expressly affirmed earlier decisions in which it had held that
fees could be awarded "even if the prior proceeding is not 'a proceeding to enforce' one of the Section 1988 civil rights laws, [as long
as it] was 'both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance
the civil rights litigation.' "248
Thus, the Court explicitly endorsed the availability of fees
where plaintiffs have utilized a body of law separate and distinct
from federal civil rights law. The question is whether the result is
compatible with that law. 2 ' There is no reason, and the Court has
never suggested one, for distinguishing between state law and federal
administrative law in this context.
Second, the Court found that Congress was well within its authority in determining that fees should be limited to judicial
1091 (1987); Gans, The Supreme Court's Interpretationof Section 1988 and Awards of Attorne,'s Fees for Work Perforned in Adninistrative Proceedings: A Proposalfor a ResultOriented Approach, 62 WASH. L. REV. 889 (1987).
240. The Civil Rights Act prohibits "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin." Crest Street, 479
U.S. at 8.
241. Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 12.
242. This includes fees for proceedings which are "followed by a lawsuit." Id. at 13.
243. Id. at 15.
244. Cf Gans, supra note 239, at 903 (arguing that under a results test, fees should
have been awarded in this case).
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proceedings.
But an award of attorney's fees under Section 1988 depends not
only on the results obtained, but also on what actions were
needed to achieve those results. It is entirely reasonable to limit
the award of attorney's fees to those parties who, in order to
obtain relief, found it necessary to file a complaint in court. 4
Whatever the merits of this argument, and whatever the special features of such proceedings may be that justify such a limitation, they
are surely just as compelling in state court as they are in federal
court.
b. Hewitt v. Helms
In Hewitt,2" respondent inmate was sentenced to six months'
disciplinary confinement for his alleged participation in a state
prison riot. The only evidence against him had been an officer's report of the statements of an undisclosed informant. The respondent
filed a lawsuit against the prison officials under Section 1983, but he
was released on parole before the case was decided. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the
respondent's due process rights were violated by his conviction because it was based solely on hearsay. While the matter was pending
on remand, the State Corrections Bureau revised its regulations to
address the use of such information. The Third Circuit awarded fees
on the basis of its earlier determination that the respondent had
shown a violation of his due process rights. The matter was remanded to the district court to determine whether the lawsuit was a
"catalyst" for the change in prison regulations.
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the respondent was
not a prevailing party under the Fees Act because he achieved none
of the relief he sought through his lawsuit. Moreover, the Court held
that the catalyst theory was inapplicable because the respondent
himself obtained no relief by means of the change in regulations,
since he had been released from prison by the time it was made.
Justice Scalia rejected the respondent's argument that the declaration
by the Third Circuit that he had been denied due process amounted
to "relief" within the meaning of the Fees Act:
245. Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 14.
246. 482 U.S. 755 (1987). See generally Jones & Rhine, Due Process and Prison DisciplinarV Practices:From Wolff to Hewitt, 11 N. ENGLAND ON CRIME & CIV. CONFINEMENT
44 (1985); Comment, Liberty Within Prison Walls as a Natural Right? Hewitt v. Helms, 11
N. ENGLAND J. ON CRIME & CIV. CONFINEMENT 217 (1985).
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To suggest such an equivalency [that the Third Circuit's statement of law was equivalent to declaratory relief] is to lose sight
of the nature of the judicial process. In all civil litigation, the
judicial decree is not the ends but the means. At the end of the
rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of
action) by the defendant that the judgment produces-the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but
from the defendant .. .The 'equivalency' doctrine is simply
the acknowledgment of the primacy of the redress over the
means by which it is obtained. 4
Although there is much in this decision that is troubling,248
there could be no clearer statement of the foundation for fee awards
when the relief is obtained through state law. Such fees simply "[acknowledge] the primacy of the redress over the means by which it is
obtained." Fees could not be predicated on the Third Circuit's statement of law prior to judgment because that statement did not result
in actual relief. It is the tangible relief actually achieved which determines entitlement to a fee award, not the route by which the court
reaches its conclusion. The fact that relief is obtained by way of state
law is no basis for denying fees, or for subjecting state claimants to
additional proof requirements.
c.

Smith v. Robinson

In Smith,24 9 the plaintiffs argued in pertinent part that they
were entitled to fees because they had obtained injunctive relief from
the school board's refusal to grant them a hearing at the beginning of
their litigation.25 0 The Supreme Court held that the vindication of a
constitutional right in connection with a separate preliminary hearing2 ' did not entitle the plaintiffs to fees for the remainder of the
litigation, which they won on non-fee federal grounds. The Smith
plaintiffs' demand for a hearing, and the school board's initial re247. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761.
248. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissent, in which he notes, inter alia, the majority's
acceptance of "the remarkable proposition that the request for expungement of respondent's
record became moot upon his parole." Id. at 761 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
250. See generally Note, Congress, Smith v.Robinson, and the Myth of Attorney Representation in Special Education Hearings: Is Attorney Representation Desirable? 37 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1161, 1170-76 (1987) (reviewing Sinith's rationale for denying attorneys fees for
EHA claims).
251. The Smith plaintiffs were awarded fees in connection with obtaining that preliminary injunctive relief. 468 U.S. at 1008.
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fusal to grant it, was characterized by the Court as "entirely separate" from the plaintiffs' claims in the ensuing litigation for a free
public education.
Under Hagans/ Gibbs, as noted above, the relationship between
the fee claim and the state claim on which the plaintiff prevails may
be as attenuated as the relationship between the claims raised in the
preliminary hearing and those adjudicated in the main case in
Smith.15 2 Even the Smith plaintiffs' initial demand for a hearing
could have been melded into the main proceeding under the broad
transactional interpretation of Gibbs. Thus, the Smith Court's rejection of the plaintiff's fee claim on the ground that it was insufficiently related to the non-fee federal claim on which they prevailed
bodes ill for Hagans/Gibbs on the issue of fees.
Smith requires a clear nexus between the fee and non-fee
claims, and looks for that nexus in the relief sought under the two
claims. The crux of the decision in Smith was the distinction between the relief granted as a result of the denial of a preliminary
hearing and the relief obtained as a result of the proceedings that
followed. The Court concluded that the preliminary order maintaining the handicapped child's placement in school throughout the litigation did not contribute to the ultimate relief won the interpretation
of state law holding that the School Committee was responsible for
the cost of his education. 58
In denying fees, the Smith Court focused on the relief obtained
under what it determined to be the plaintiff's non-fee claim in the
main action," and the relief available under plaintiff's preliminary
fee claim. This is precisely what a court would do in applying the
prevailing party test where the plaintiff prevails on a non-fee state
claim, if the State Claims Tests were no longer considered binding.
Thus, Smith provides powerful, albeit implicit, support for both the
rejection of Hagans/Gibbs and the adoption of the prevailing party
test in the state claim context.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
253. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1008.
254. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the fee claim in the main action was preempted by the EHA, which provided a parallel basis for relief. It did so in such a comprehensive manner, opined the Supreme Court, as to show that Congress intended the EHA to preempt an action under section 1983, which would have given rise to a fee claim. Thus, Justice
Blackmun concluded that Congress did not intend to permit fees in such actions since there
was no fee-shifting provision in the express EHA. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1015. The flawed reasoning underlying this result was pointed out in the stinging dissent of Justices Marshall,
Brennan and Stevens, and rectified by Congress through passage of an amendment.
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In Garland,2 the petitioners, state and local teachers associations and members, claimed that respondent school district violated
their first and fourteenth amendment rights by prohibiting communication regarding employee organizations by or with teachers during
the school day. 56 The primary issue was access to teachers and
school facilities by employee organizations. In addition, internally
proscribed activities included teacher-to-teacher discussion and the
use of internal bulletin boards and mail. While petitioners failed to
obtain the primary relief sought, the district court granted summary
judgment with respect to their other claims.25 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the denial of their application for fees
under the Fees Act on the ground that an award of fees was precluded under the "central issue test" followed in that circuit.2 58
Under that test, only plaintiffs prevailing on the main issue, as opposed to those prevailing on merely "significant" issues, were entitled to fees. 259
Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court expressly
adopted the standard enunciated in Nadeau v. Helgemoe.26 ° Under
Nadeau, fees are available to parties who "succeed on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit [they]
'
This decision is worth noting here for
sought in bringing suit."261
26 First, the requirement that the plaintiffs isolate a
two reasons.
"central issue" in often labyrinthine litigation and then demonstrate
that they have prevailed with respect to that issue would have had a
particularly harsh impact on state claimants in multi-claim litigation. By rejecting this test, the Court not only unanimously refused
to condone the evisceration of the Fees Act, but explicitly recognized
the complex nature of the cases in which claims under the Act are
likely to arise.26 8 Second, confirming its focus in Hensley, the Court
255. 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
256. Id. at 1487.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1488.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Nadeau, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978)).
261. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79 (quoted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983).
262. See generally Greenhouse, Justices Broaden Basis For Fee Award in Civil Rights
Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1989.
263. As Professor Richard Larson has observed, Garland was not a difficult case. Given
the nearly universal repudiation of the "central issue" test, and the weight of authority against
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reiterated its emphasis on the actual relief obtained. State claimants
prevailing on state grounds remain eligible for fees under- the test as
clarified by Garland.
The reasoning of the Garland Court is similarly pertinent to
the analysis here. The Court rejected the "central issue" test in part
because it seemed irreconcilable with the well-settled availability of
interim fees to prevailing plaintiffs.2 64 Such fees are awarded before
it is known whether the relief obtained is "central" or merely peripheral to the result ultimately achieved.26 It would be inconsistent
to deny fees to plaintiffs seeking them at the conclusion of litigation
in connection with what may at that point be considered a "significant" issue, when fees would have been granted had they been
sought at an earlier stage, when the issue looked more "central."
This is structurally analogous to the argument advanced above,
where fees are frequently available to plaintiffs who have not obtained a favorable ruling on their federal claim,266 but instead, have
obtained relief through settlement or merely because they have acted
as "catalysts. ' '217 The merits of the federal fee claim are left unaddressed in such circumstances, precisely as they are where the plaintiff obtains the relief sought by prevailing on her state claim. All that
can be said with certainty about the merits of the federal fee claim in
either case is that the defendant was 1) unable or unwilling to get it
dismissed, and 2) unable to avoid the relief sought thereunder. Denial of fees to state claimants, like denial of fees to plaintiffs prevailing on a "significant" issue, would clash with firmly established precedent, as well as the spirit of the Fees Act. 2 6
The Garland Court sensibly avoids the mysteries of causality
in favor of the relative certainty of demonstrable results. As Justice
O'Connor observed:
[T]he search for the 'central' and 'tangential' issues in the lawsuit, or for the 'primary' as opposed to the 'secondary' relief
it, the Court's rejection of the test was predictable. Telephone interview with Professor Larson,
N.Y.U. School of Law (Apr. 10, 1989).
264. See Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
265. It is not precisely clear why the Garland Court viewed this as dispositive. If the
central issue test were adopted, subsequently vindicated defendants could simply seek reimbursement with regard to interim fees later found to have been improvidently granted. This is
what happens now when fees are paid prior to exhaustion of all appeals.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 215-22.
267. A plaintiff may be considered a "catalyst" in changing defendant's policy, and thus
be entitled to fees, even though she achieves no formal judgment or consent decree. See supra
notes 52 & 220-22.
268. Garland, 109 S. Ct. at 1488.
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sought, much like the search for the Golden Fleece, distracts the
district court from the primary purposes behind [sec.] 1988 and
unhelpful in defining the term 'prevailing
is essentially
269
party.'
At the same time, Garland merely halts the erosion of the Fees Act;
it expands entitlement only for those in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, formerly subject to the "central issue" test. It does not benefit
prevailing plaintiffs elsewhere. Indeed, dicta may encourage some
courts to adopt a more restrictive approach: "Where the plaintiffs
success on a legal claim can be characterized as purely technical or
de minimis, a district court would be justified in concluding that even
2
the 'generous formulation' we adopt today has not been satisfied." '
The Court explicitly refers to the "situation" in Hewitt as an
27
As Justice O'Connor opines:
example of an undeserving claim.
"The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which
'
Congress sought to promote in the fee statute. "272
3. Policy Reasons for Applying the Prevailing Party Test to
State Law Claims
There are two basic policy reasons for abandoning the State
Claims Tests and simply applying the prevailing party test to claim2
ants seeking fees predicated on state law claims. "' First, this would
further refine the applicability of the Fees Act. More of the plaintiffs
who actually vindicate civil rights would be awarded fees. Second,
such relief-focused awards graphically place state law in the federal
civil rights context, thereby expanding the actual as well as the symbolic scope and impact of the remedial statutes.
Clarification of the standards for granting fees to state civil
rights claimants is crucial because of the mounting numbers of such
cases, and the demonstrated inability of the State Claims Tests to
deal with them in a coherent, predictable fashion. Under existing
law, prevailing plaintiffs who achieve that status by virtue of a successful state claim are the only state court plaintiffs who must satisfy
a further test before fees may be awarded. Abandonment of that test
permits awards for those prevailing plaintiffs who would have been
269. Id. at 1493.
270. Id.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 248-49.
272. Garland, 109 S. Ct. at 1493.
273. Cf supra text accompanying notes 255-72 (rejection of "central issue" test).
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unfairly eliminated by it.2 74 Civil rights lawyers, moreover, are far
more likely to be familiar with the prevailing party test, which is
ubiquitous in civil rights litigation, than the State Claims Tests
which, as we have seen, have a limited and idiosyncratic
application. 75
The second policy justification for the utilization of the prevailing party test in this context, while less concrete, is probably more
important. This involves the symbolic value of measuring the results
achieved under state law by a federal test, and requires a subtle conceptual shift. By predicating the award of fees on the result achieved,
even if that result is reached by way of state law, the state law is no
longer merely an end in itself but becomes the means of accomplishing a federal purpose. As various state laws are used in this way,
and state precedent established, the body of law under which civil
rights are protected may be exponentially expanded. Fee awards
under the prevailing party test for relief obtained via state law show
that plaintiffs have obtained substantive relief available under a federal fee-shifting statute by using state law. Thus, by demonstrating a
clear nexus between the result achieved through state law claims and
the result which could have been achieved through a federal civil
rights claim, use of the prevailing party test charts an alternative
route for future litigants.
State legislators may object to the use of state legislation for the
promotion of civil rights. The author does not suggest any substantive expansion of state law for that purpose, however, but merely a
greater recognition of pre-existing law which can already be utilized.
State legislative intent should not thwart the creative and vigorous
use of law, even if such use was not explicitly contemplated by its
drafters.27 6
B. Some Problems with the Prevailing Party Test Where the State
Court Claimant Has Prevailed on a State Claim
This section considers some of the difficulties with the proposal,
including the apparent necessity of a legal determination as to
274. See infra text accompanying note 289 (noting lack of empirical data as to the actual numbers of such plaintiffs and the consequences of the prevailing party test in general).
Whatever the numbers, however, an additional group may well be discouraged by the State
Claims Tests from applying for fees.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 73-161.
276. See generally Tribe, supra note 233; Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts, 63 N.C.L. REV. 879 (1985). Of course, the state
legislature can always amend or repeal a law which does more than it was expected to do.
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whether the relief obtained was in fact "properly available" under
applicable law,2 7 and whether the proposal ultimately shifts greater
discretion back to the federal courts. The problems raised by utilization of the test are not limited to the state claim/state court context.
Rather, these are problems inherent in the prevailing party test itself. As solutions are devised for these problems, by the courts or
Congress, the impact on prevailing state claimants should be taken
into account. Analysis of these questions in the context of state court
litigation, moreover, may generate fresh approaches facilitating their
eventual resolution.
1. What relief entitles a plaintiff to prevailing party status?
Perhaps the major difficulty is deciding whether the plaintiff in
fact prevailed. Where the relief obtained as a result of the decision
on the state claim is relief conventionally granted under the fee
279
claim;2 78 for example, the right to live in subsidized housing or the
2 80 the fee entitlement
right to employment previously denied women;
is clear. But where it is plain that the relief may not be ordered
under the fee claim, or where it is questionable whether it could be
ordered,281 entitlement to fees becomes more problematic. Since proceedings in state court on state claims are more apt to involve novel
questions of state law, which may well include claims for equally
novel forms of relief, this scenario is correspondingly more likely in
state court.
Where the relief is clearly unavailable under the federal
claim-even if it unquestionably promotes civil rights-it could be
argued that fees should not be allowable for several reasons. The
defendants had no notice of their potential liability. Moreover, no
"legitimate federal purpose" has been furthered if it has already
been determined that the relief obtained is not within the ambit of
the fee-shifting statute. Finally, as a corollary, since there is no federal authority for the relief obtained, a fee award represents the
usurpation of the legislative function by the state court. A provision
277. "[Tihe benefit must not only result from the suit, but must also be one to which the
plaintiff was legally entitled," Note, supra note 221, at 476.
278. See generally Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 513 (1958).

279.
280.
281.
cedures in
Cir. 1987).

Jones v. Orange Hous. Auth., 559 F. Supp. 1379 (D.N.J. 1983).
Johnson v. Transportation Agency Santa Clara City, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
Requiring a city to institute a computerized system to monitor administrative proconnection with arraignment, for example. Cf Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d
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for attorneys' fees awards is effectively being grafted onto a state law
by the state court, rather than by the state legislature."' 2
In many cases it may be unclear whether the relief obtained
could have been predicated on the federal fee claim.28 The arguments in favor of awards, under these circumstances, indicate the
potential sweep of the proposal to abandon the State Claims Tests.
The language of the fee-shifting statutes is arguably broad enough to
include almost any relief which furthers the purpose of those statutes. Relief may further the purpose of the fee claim even if the
statute does not explicitly provide for such relief. Title VIII does not
expressly contemplate the actual construction of housing, for example." ' If housing is in fact produced as a result of a lawsuit, however, plaintiff should be considered prevailing.2" 5 Under federal law,
even if a result could not have been ordered by the court, its achievement may nevertheless confer "prevailing party" status on the plaintiff. By extending this analysis to state law, relief adroitly molded to
address particular local conditions could be considered within the
scope of the civil rights statutes and fees could be awarded to those
who had achieved such relief.
2.

The analysis required of the court

Where it is an open question whether the relief obtained could
have been ordered under the federal fee-shifting statute, the analysis
required by the state court raises problems. First, the court is being
called upon to render a legal determination which the parties and
the court have successfully avoided up to this point. Since this determination is more a question of law than of fact, it is unlikely that
significant additional evidence will be required. Although this adjudication may be less time consuming than that required by
282. Cf Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977) (legislation authorizing
fee awards where plaintiff prevails on a state constitutional claim had already been passed,
although it was not yet in effect when the Court applied the same principle). CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980). See generally McDermott & Rothchild, The Private Attorney
General Rule and Public Interest Litigation in California, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 138 (1978);
Hermann & Hoffman, FinancingPublic Interest Litigation in State Courts: A Proposalfor
Legislative Action, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 173 (1978).
283. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri 788 S.W.2d 536 (1990); Greenhouse, Justices to
Study Power ofJudiciary in Taxation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1989, at A22, col. 1 (Supreme
Court will decide whether federal courts exceeded their constitutional authority by ordering
tax increases to finance school desegregation).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
285. See Urban League v. Mayor and Council of Carteret, 115 N.J. 536, 559 A.2d
1369 (1989) (one of the Mount Laurel cases).
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Morales,26 many of the same arguments against post hoc adjudications apply. 8 ' The real difference is that the post hoc adjudication
has been altered from one of fact and law to a narrower one of law.
This becomes a question of balancing a somewhat dubious improvement in efficiency against the risks that are inherent in a completely
speculative legal determination.
This is a problem faced by all courts in applying the prevailing
party test, however. The state courts' reluctance to order otherwise
unnecessary plenary proceedings288 and their apparent willingness to
render decisions with respect to similarly speculative constitutional
questions, suggest that the determinations required under the prevailing party test would not be espelcially troublesome for state
courts.
3.

More open questions

Several difficult questions remain open, reflecting the theoretical
and political tensions underlying the proposal. It is beyond the scope
of this article to exhaustively explore such questions. Broad areas
offering rich opportunities for further consideration include the desirability of empirical validation; the impact, if any, on the balance
of power between state and federal governments, and the threshold
dilemma presented by implementation: how would abandonment of
the State Claims Tests be accomplished?
a.

Empirical studies

A comprehensive, fact specific analysis of state court litigation
under the fee-shifting statutes would be invaluable. The prevailing
party test is already used in state courts where plaintiff's relief is not
predicated on her state law claim. The abandonment of the State
Claims Tests merely expands its application to an additional class of
cases. The empirical consequences of the utilization of the prevailing
party test in state court should at least be considered before urging
such an expanded application.
State courts have often been unsympathetic to the constitutional
rights that underlie the civil rights statutes. As Burt Neuborne has
noted, "No comparative study of the relative performance of state
and federal courts in the enforcement of constitutional rights appears
to exist. However, the impact of state hostility to Supreme Court
286. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
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mandates has been noted." ' 9
Even if, as argued above, state courts provide an increasingly
attractive forum for the vindication of civil rights violations, they
might be more reluctant than federal courts to award fees, or more
conservative in doing so.

b. Federalism questions
By increasing the opportunities for state courts to define "prevailing parties" under the federal fee-shifting statutes, the abandonment of the State Claims Tests could affect the balance of power
between the federal and state courts with respect to this issue. Is it
desirable to increase the states' influence in interpreting the law governing fee awards? As Judge Uter reminds us, "State courts do not
have to consider the national implications of their decisions." 0 Even
though a state court decision is not binding on federal tribunals or
the courts of other states, it may be very influential, particularly
where it addresses a matter of first impression.
This is, of course, a continuation of a very old debate." ' In
1928, then-Professor Felix Frankfurter urged a careful analysis of
the underlying rights in order to decide whether the case involved
"lively local interests" more properly adjudicated in federal court.
The federal rights in issue, moreover, may themselves be "heavily
enmeshed in conflicts between state and national authority."2'92 Are
289. Neuborne, supra note 13, at 1116 n.46. Professor Neuborne's observation 13 years
ago certainly remains true of some state courts with regard to the pro-civil rights Supreme
Court mandates to which he was referring. The extent of state court hostility to the recent
opinions of the Supreme Court curtailing civil rights is an open question. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
290. Uter, Swimmtiing in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1025, 1045 (1985). But see M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 6, at 14-18 (observing
that state courts have generally applied federal standards in interpreting section 1988, including awarding fees when federal constitutional claim pretermitted because the case is decided on
state law grounds). M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 6, at 14-19 & n.32.
291. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 288 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
292. Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 515:
National sentiment also regards federal tribunals as the appropriate guardians
of federal rights. But it is a practical sentiment. There are limits to the effective
enforcement of national law. Wise distribution of judicial power also depends
upon the nature of the issues. Some federal rights are readily adapted to enforcement by state tribunals; others are clearly meant for the federal courts.
Some federal rights involve no lively local interests; others are heavily enmeshed
in conflicts between state and national authority. Civilized law rests on
discrimination.
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state courts the best place for the resolution of such questions?
Abandonment of the State Claims Tests may, on the other
hand, indirectly expand the role of the federal courts in matters previously left to the states. As suggested above, rejection of the State
Claims Tests may shift the court's emphasis in deciding fees, from a
mixed law and fact determination to more of a legal question. 9 3
Such a shift might encourage Supreme Court review since the Court
is generally more inclined to consider whether there was an error of
law than an abuse of discretion below.2 9 ' How would this affect
claimants who looked to state court as a refuge from an unfriendly
federal bench?295
Although a major justification for rejection of the State Claims
Tests is to facilitate adjudication of fee claims in state court, doing so
is likely to alter the existing balance of power between state and
federal government in ways which we cannot foresee. It is similarly
impossible to predict how increased utilization of the prevailing
party test in the state court/state claim context may transform the
test itself.
C. How Could the State Claims Tests Be Abandoned?
Even if the State Claims Tests were, as suggested above, ignored by the state courts,2 96 it is not clear that the prevailing party
293. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88.
294. See Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 604 (1984)
(noting practical limitations on Supreme Court review of federal claims denied by state courts).
But see Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 54 & n.109 (1981) (providing
examples of the Supreme Court's exercise of "jurisdiction to ride herd on the state courts") Cf
Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 982 (1985) (The state court
could avoid review of its decision by making a " 'plain statement' that it used the federal law
for guidance only." This would be limited to states whose laws provided an independent basis
for the award of fees.)
295. This presents a slight, perhaps even a trivial, risk in view of the minute percentage
of appeals accepted for review by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., G. CASPER & R. POSNER,
THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1976); see generally Welsh, Reconsidering the

Constitutional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v.
Long, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1118 (1984).

296. Where the highest state court has already adopted the State Claims Tests, of
course, overruling that adoption would have to be justified. One possibility might be a constitutional challenge under the necessary and proper clause. See supra notes 165-70 & 199 and
accompanying text. But who would bring such a suit? Public interest groups might be hesitant
to attack the State Claims Tests since they have often benefitted from them. (Such groups
could certainly challenge the tests, however, while pleading in the alternative that in their
particular lawsuits plaintiffs satisfied the tests). Would a private party have standing to raise
this issue?
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test would automatically become operative, like water flowing into
the empty space when an island sinks. It is problematic whether judicial action, or inaction, would render further clarifying legislation
unnecessary. Would civil rights claimants, who arguably have the
most to gain, risk reopening the legislation? Even if there was less at
stake, it is questionable whether legislative revision would be sought
for what would be considered a merely technical flaw. As Professor
Leubsdorf has pointed out:
Political realities discourage legislative procedural reform. The
public has little grasp of civil procedure and little interest in it.
Those who suffer from a bad procedural rule usually do not
know in advance that they will be its victims, or even that the
rule exists, and are usually scattered and disorganized. They
will therefore not seek change.""
While these are real problems, they are certainly not insurmountable
if civil rights advocates decide that the prevailing party test is in fact
the better test for determining whether fees should be awarded in
connection with state claims brought in state courts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the revival of the civil rights struggle was accompanied by the realization that continuing efforts required "private attorney generals" and a mechanism for paying their legal fees.
After being prodded by the Alyeska decision, Congress enacted the
Fees Act. The somewhat fortuitous inclusion of the State Claims
Tests reflected an astute appreciation of the increasingly important
role of the state courts.
The State Claims Tests had two purposes: first, they sought to
legitimate fee claims in state as well as federal court predicated on
state law. Second, they purported to establish standards, borrowed
from federal court decisions in Morales and Hagans/Gibbs, which
would ensure that the court had the authority to award fees. The
viability of the State Claims Tests has generally been acknowledged
by the state courts. Indeed, their first purpose has been basically accomplished. It is widely accepted that fees may be awarded where
Would the court hear such a challenge? Could it do so without revisiting Garcia? See
generally Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 847 (1979). How often will a state have fees imposed against it where, regardless of the
State Claims Tests, a strong case cannot be made that such imposition does in fact further
Congress' purpose? Could a state, by means of a legislative bar, immunize'itself from liability,
notwithstanding Hutto v. Finney, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978).
297. Leubsdorf, supra note 294, at 613.
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the plaintiff prevails on state law in state court.
The State Claims Tests have been conspicuously less successful
in establishing a framework for such awards. Morales and Hagans/
Gibbs effectively have been rejected because they are incompatible
with the structure of civil rights lawsuits in state court. The state
courts, while embracing the State Claims Tests as authority for
awards, have been forced to develop convoluted analyses to accommodate the fundamental illogic of the tests in the state court fee context. This undermines the federal fee-shifting scheme.
Fees should be awarded to state plaintiffs who further civil
rights by prevailing under state laws. Such fees are "necessary and
proper" to advance the congressional purpose of protecting civil
rights as long as they satisfy the already extant prevailing party test.
This test has been clarified by the Supreme Court in several decisions since the passage of the Fees Act. Although these decisions may
severely circumscribe the scope of fee awards, they are completely
consistent with the application of the prevailing party test as the only
prerequisite for fees for civil rights claimants in state court. The
State Claims Tests have served their purpose, insofar as they had a
valid purpose, and they should be jettisoned. As state courts and state
law are increasingly relied upon by civil rights claimants, impediments to the fully effective operation of the private attorney general
model, such as the State Claims Tests, should be eradicated.
Attorneys' fees in civil rights litigation are not a windfall. In
fact, they rarely compensate claimants and their attorneys for the
real costs of such cases. Much civil rights litigation would be unthinkable without these "pennies from heaven," however, and they
should fall as freely on state court claimants as they do on their federal court counterparts.

